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ABSTRACT 
In a recent decision, the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recognised a qualified 
privilege for war correspondents in setting out a test that must be overcome 
before the Trial Chamber will issue a subpoena. This paper examines the 
decision and the test by comparing it to the approaches of other jurisdictions 
and any general principles of law that arise from these. It also considers 
whether the decision is consistent with the internationally recognised rights 
of freedom of expression and to a fair trial. It argues that the international 
tribunals should take all of these sources into account in formulating rules of 
procedure and evidence, but should also give particular regard to the 
purposes of international criminal justice, which relate to furthering the 
establishment of peace. 
In this context it is argued that the interests of the international 
criminal justice system are best served by the creation of a distinct 
procedural framework that contains clear and principled rules. The Appeals 
Chamber's formulation of a journalistic privilege not only advances this 
goal, but also recognises that the ability of war correspondents to report on 
conflicts is vitally important to the international community, including the 
international courts themselves. The potential impact on this ability arising 
from the work of the courts necessitates special consideration and a degree 
of protection for this group. 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14 780 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
There is no denying that what we see and hear in the media affects 
both our knowledge and our opinions of world events. Information about 
conflicts occurring around the world can result in various responses from 
the international public and action from govemm'ents, the United Nations, 
and non-governmental groups. 1 One outcome is the indicting of 
individuals for war crimes. In this context, the ability of journalists to obtain 
evidence and witness events is often greater than that of government or 
United Nations officials.2 That their newsgathering also means that they 
may be valuable witnesses in the subsequent trials of alleged war criminals 
has given rise to considerable debate about what the role of journalists 
should be in international judicial proceedings. This issue has now reached 
the chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (I CTY) in what this paper will refer to as Randal 's case. 3 
1 In the case of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, it is recognised that "as the public was 
flooded with more and more media reports of atrocities, the pressure on the Security 
Council increased to confirm those reports and, once confirmed, to take action." Scott T 
Johnson "On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1998) 10 Intl Legal Persp 111 , 114. 
Furthermore, the United States Government, " faced with mounting political pressure to 
respond constructively to the continuing reports of widespread atrocities, decided to direct 
its energies toward establishing an ad hoe international tribunal." Michael P Scharf 
"Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court" (1994) 6 Pace Intl L Rev I 03, 
106. 
2 For example, Boston Globe foreign editor James Smith points to the situation of 
journalists covering the allegations of massacres of Palestinian civilians by Israeli troops in 
the Jenin refugee camp in 2002. While UN inspectors were unsuccessfully seeking access 
to the site, reporters were "out there testing the implications of a massacre." Quoted in 
Richard Byrne " Don ' t Ask, Don ' t Tell" (30 Sept 2002) Boston Phoenix Boston 
<http://www. bosto n phoenix. com/boston/news _ features/top/features/ docu men ts/024 52 0 89. h 
tm> (last accessed 30 September 2003). And in 1997, "journalists who reported from 
Rwanda and Zaire found themselves in possession of vital information (including plans of 
imminent attacks) that Tribunal investigators could not have uncovered because they had 
not received permission to cross into Zaire." Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-
99-36-T ( 17 August 2002) "Brief Amici Curiae on Behalfof Various Media Entities and in 
Support of Jonathan Randal ' s Appeal of Trial Chamber' s ' Decision on Motion to Set Aside 
Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence"', para 26. 
3 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber II) 
"Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence"; Prosecutor v 
Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR 73 .9 ( 11 December 2002, Appeals Chamber) 
"Decision on Interlocutory Appeal" . Although this paper predominantly refers to the cases 
and rules of the ICTY, the discussion applies equally to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), which was created in the same way as the ICTY, with largely the same 
governing documents and a joint Appeals Chamber. 
2 
Jonathan Randal is a fom1er war correspondent. He spent a period of 
time covering the conflict in Bosnia as a reporter for the Washington Post. 
In 1993, Randal published an article in that newspaper in which he quoted 
Radoslav Brdjanin, who was a housing administrator at the time, as saying 
that non-Serbs living in the town of Banja Luka should be "moved out" to 
create an "ethnically clean space through voluntary movement."4 During the 
interview, which Randal conducted through the use of an interpreter, 
Brdjanin also claimed to be preparing laws to expel non-Serbs from 
government housing to make room for Serb refugees and for Serb 
combatants' families. He was quoted as stating that, in his view, the 
government in the neighbouring Serbia paid "too much attention to human 
rights" in an effort to appease European governments and Western opinion. 
Brdjanin was formally indicted in 1999 for genocide, war cnmes, 
crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949. 5 The prosecutor sought to introduce Randal' s article into evidence as 
pertaining to the state of mind of the accused leading up to the events for 
which he was indicted. The defence challenged this move on the basis that 
the introduction of the article without the opportunity for cross-examination 
of the writer was unfair, particularly as the accused considered the 
interpreter to be hostile to him and may have misrepresented what he said.6 
The prosecutor therefore obtained a subpoena to compel Randal to testify 
both to the accuracy of the quotes and the demeanour of the accused during 
the interview. 7 Randal refused to comply and challenged the subpoena, 
arguing that the Tribunal should recognise a qualified testimonial privilege 
4 
Jonathan Randal "Preserving the Fruits of Ethnic Cleansing: Bosnian Serbs, Expulsion 
Victims See Process as Beyond Reversal" ( 11 February 1993) The Washington Post 
Washington DC A34. Brdjanin was later appointed acting Vice-President in the 
Government of Republika Srpska. 
5 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-PT (14 March 1999) " Initial 
Indictment". The indictment alleged that Brdjanin "played a leading role in the 
establishment of structures for the take-over of power in the Banja Luka region by the 
Bosnian Serb authorities." He is said to have participated in the implementation of policies 
?f forced deportation and _sy~tematic liquidation of Bosnian Musi im and Croatian peoples 
m the area. Although the indictment has been amended, these allegations are the essence of 
the case against Brdjanin. See Prosecutor v Rados/av Brdjanin (7 October 2002) "Fifth 
Amended Indictment." 
~' Pro~~cutor v Brdjanin and T~lic Case No I:-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber II) 
Dec1s1on on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para 3. 
7 See Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 2. 
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for journalists in light of their important, and often dangerous, role of 
reporting from conflict zones, and the effect that compelled testimony 
would have on the right to freedom of expression. 
This paper exammes the decision of the Appeals Chamber to 
establish a test that restricts the ability of the Tribunal to subpoena war 
correspondents. It seeks to answer the following questions: Did the Tribunal 
have the authority to create a qualified privilege for journalists? If so, what 
sources of law should be considered and applied in formulating the rule? 
And, finally, does the Appeals Chamber test balance the competing interests 
of journalists, the international community, and the Tribunal in a way that is 
conducive to meeting the needs of the international criminal justice system? 
A related question is the extent to which the international tribunals may 
consider their own special circumstances in formulating rules of procedure 
and evidence. That the work of the tribunals, and of war correspondents, has 
special characteristics that justify a distinct approach to journalistic privilege 
appears to underlie the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber. 
A core proposition of this paper is that a clear and principled system 
of procedural rules must be developed through the work of the international 
criminal tribunals, and the decision in Randal 's case is one that advances 
this goal. The Appeals Chamber test for overcoming the journalistic 
privilege finds its grounding in the underlying rationale for journalists' 
public interest privilege in domestic settings, but also takes into account the 
special context and purposes of international criminal justice, and the need 
to keep abreast of developments concerning fundamental hun1an rights. 
These considerations are vitally important to ensuring the long-term 
legitimacy, and subsequent effectiveness, of the international criminal 
justice system. Furthermore, the provision of some protection for journalists 
in a way that fairly balances the competing interests of the right to freedom 
of expression and the administration of justice serves the broad needs of the 
international community to receive information about acts committed during 
conflicts, and to respond accordingly. 
4 
II RANDAL'S CASE: ARGUMENTS AND DECISIONS 
Randal had originally provided a statement to the prosecutor in 
which he confirmed that he could testify to the accuracy of the quotes 
contained in his article, although he also stated that he would prefer if the 
article stood on its own. 8 As a result of the defence' s challenge to the 
admission of the article he was subpoenaed pursuant to Rule 54 of the 
ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules).
9 
This provision 
authorises the Trial Chamber to "issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, 
warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an 
investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial."
10 
If Randal's 
claim to a privilege had failed, and he had continued to refuse to comply 
with the subpoena, then he could have been held in contempt of the Tribunal 
in accordance with Rule 77, and consequently faced a large fine or a term of 
· · II 1mpnsonrnent. 
A The Arguments of the Parties
12 
In challenging the subpoena, Randal took the position that the 
implications of parties being able to subpoena journalists without 
restrictions went far beyond his own circumstances. 
13 
He argued that the 
8 See Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber II) 
" Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para 28(iii). 
Randal stated that he took "particular pride in ensuring that all quotes were absolutely 
accurate." 
9 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory ofFormer Yugoslavia Since 1991 (11 February 1994) UN Doc IT/32 (as 
amended) (hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence). 
10 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 54. 
11 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 77 provides: "(A) The Tribunal in the exercise of 
its inherent power may hold in contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with 
its administration of justice, including any person who (i) being a witness before a 
Chamber, contumaciously refuses to answer a question ; (iii) without just excuse fails to 
comply with an order to attend before or produce documents before a Chamber; .. . (G) The 
maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in contempt of the Tribunal 
shall be a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years, or a fine not exceeding I 00 ,000 
Euros, or both." 
12 The Defence did not provide a reply, despite earlier indicating that they would like to 
participate in the discussion before the Tribunal. See Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case 
No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (11 December 2002, Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal", footnote I 0. 
13 Randal had retired from journalism and would not face any personal danoer as a result of 
testifying. "' 
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consequences of routinely compelling the testimony of journalists would be 
that: 14 
(i) journalists ' independence would be undermined and journalists would 
have fewer opportunities to conduct interviews with officials with 
superior authority, particularly in conflicts that are ongoing, (ii) 
journalists would as a collective profession be put at risk of greater harm 
and danger, including exposing their sources to such risk and, as a result 
therefore, (iii) the amount of information that conflict zone reporters are 
able to produce, including specifically information about crimes against 
humanity, would tend to dry up. 
Randal considered that the Tribunal ' s power to subpoena witnesses 
is not absolute, and should be limited by "public policy concerns"; 15 in this 
case the international community's interest in receiving information from 
war correspondents. He therefore argued for a multi-part test that would 
essentially create a "presumption against compulsory process for journalists 
except in extraordinary situations." 16 
On the other hand, the prosecution argued that testifying created no 
danger "that publicly important information will become unavailable," 17 and 
therefore that Randal offered "no substantial interest that would override the 
powerful public interest that all relevant evidence be available to [the] 
Tribunal, and Brdjanin's right to a fair trial." 18 It submitted that the risk of 
harm or loss of sources for journalists arises not from the possibility that 
14 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber 11) 
"Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para 11. 
15 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case, above, para 9. 
16 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, paras 12 and 14. The test proposed by Randal 
was that the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the journalist's testimony would provide 
admissible evidence that " (I) is of ' crucial importance ' to determining a defendant ' s guilt 
or innocence; (2) cannot be obtained ' by any other means or from any other witness '; (3) 
will not require the journalist to breach any obligation of confidence; (4) will not place the 
journalist, his family, or his sources in reasonably apprehended personal danger; and (5) 
will not serve as a precedent that will 'unnecessarily jeopardise the effectiveness or safety 
of other journalists reporting from that conflict zone in the future ."' Prosecutor v Brdjanin 
and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (11 December 2002, Appeals Chamber) " Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal", para 15. 
17 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 16 (Trial Chamber). 
18 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 22 (Trial Chamber). 
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they might be called to testify about the stories that they publish, but from 
the fact of publication in itself. 19 
B The Trial Chamber Decision 
The Trial Chamber II, while accepting that journalists reporting from 
conflict areas "play a vital role in bringing to the attention of the 
international community the horrors and reality of the conflict," and should 
therefore not be subpoenaed unnecessarily,20 rejected Randal's claim to a 
privilege. The judgment does indicate, however, that in a different case 
involving the disclosure of confidential sources, the Tribunal would not 
provide a lower level of protection that that set out in the decision of the 
European Court of Human llights in the case of Goodwin v United 
Kingdom. 21 The Trial Chamber considered that this decision "certainly sets 
a standard in the sphere of journalistic privilege for the years to come."
22 It 
therefore held that since the fundamental question of protecting confidential 
sources did not arise in Randal ' s situation, this was the wrong case to set out 
a new privilege.23 Thus it was sufficient that his testimony would be 
' pertinent' to the case in order to uphold the subpoena.24 
The Trial Chamber decision therefore suggests that where aspects of 
the right to freedom of expression are implicated, such as in cases involving 
the protection of confidential sources, this will "inevitably need to be 
considered within the overriding principle that the course of justice is not 
unduly impeded by the withholding of evidence."25 The approach that it 
proposed in such situations is a "delicate balancing exercise which will vary 
from case to case. "26 It does not set out what the factors to be considered in 
19 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36 (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber II) 
" Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para 25. 
20 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 25 . 
2 1 Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EH RR 123. See Part IV 3 2 United 
Kingdom/Europe. 
22 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 31. 
23 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, paras 28 and 31. The article explicitly identified 
Brdjanin as being the source of the quotes. 
24 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 32. 
25 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 27. 
26 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 27. 
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this exercise might be, or discuss whether there are other situations where 
freedom of expression would be affected by compelled testimony. 
C The Amicus Curiae and the Appeals Chamber Decision 
Randal' s appeal of the Trial Chamber decision was supported by an 
amicus brief filed on behalf of 34 media organisations from around the 
world.27 The case, and the decision of other journalists to testify voluntarily 
at the Tribunals,28 had generated considerable discussion among journalists 
and media commentators.29 One commentator stated that Randal 's case 
27 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No JT-99-36-T (17 August 2002) "Brief Amici 
Curiae on Behalf of Various Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal's Appeal of 
Trial Chamber' s ' Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give 
Evidence"'. This was thought to be the largest group of media organisations ever to join a 
brief of this type. Leave was granted to the amici to submit the brief under Rule 74 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence which states: "A Chamber may, if it considers it desirable 
for the proper determination of a case, invite or grant leave to a State, organisation or 
person to appear before it and make submissions on any issue specified by the Chamber." 
28 In particular, Ed Vulliamy of The Guardian testified in the trial ofTihomir Blaskic. See 
Prosecutor v Blaskic Case No IT-95-14 (3 March 2000, Trial Chamber I) "Judgment" . 
More recently, BBC correspondent Jackie Rowland testified against Slobodan Milosevic. 
See Prosecutor v Milosevic Case No IT-02-43 (27-28 August 2002, Trial Chamber) 
Unofficial Transcript, 8912-9012. See also Stephanie van den Berg "British Journalist 
Gives Evidence at Milosevic Trial" (27 August 2002) 
<http: //www.softcom.net/webnews/wed/cx/Qwarcrimes-yugo-media.Rz 1 y _ CaR.html> (last 
accessed 19 September 2003); Ed Vulliamy "An Obligation to the Truth" (I 9 May 2002) 
The Observer London 
<http: //www.observer.co.uk/milosevic/story/O, I 0639,718225,00.html> (last accessed 19 
September 2003). The two journalists considered that they had a duty to testify, both in 
terms of their accountability to their readers and to the cause of international justice. 
29 See, for example, Chantal Eustace "Journalists on the scales of justice" (October 2002) 5 
Thunderbird I <http://www.journalism.ubc.ca/thunderbird/200 I 
02/october02/tribunal.html> (last accessed 19 September 2003); Ariel Meyerstein "The 
Role of War Correspondents in International Criminal Justice: ICTY orders Journalist to 
Testify" ( 19 June 2002) <http: //www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-warcorrespond.htrnl> 
(last accessed 19 September 2003); Elaine Hargrove-Simon "Former Washington Post 
Reporter Subpoenaed by International Criminal Tribunal" (2002) 7 Silha Bulletin no 4 
<http: //silha.cla.umn.edu/summer2002 .htm> (last accessed 25 August 2003); Roy Gutman 
"Consequences Occur When Reporters Testify" (2003) Nieman Reports 74 
<http: //www.nieman .harvard.edu/reports/03- lNRspring/74-77V57N I .pdt> (last accessed 
29 September 2003); William Satire " International Court Will Inhibit Press Freedom" 
(June 21 2002) The New York Times New York 
<http: //www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/20/ 10238644 77172.htrnl> (last accessed 15 
August 2003); Brandt Goldstein "When Can You Make a Reporter Testify?" (25 June 
2002) <http: //slate.msn.com/?id=2067357> (last accessed 15 August 2003). In particular, 
the responses highlighted the divergence in opinions between United States journalists and 
their European counterparts. As one law professor commented, while "American journalists 
tend to see the tribunal ' s subpoena as a threat to First Amendment freedoms, many 
European journalists see testimony before the tribunal as an extension of the journalistic 
enterprise." Dianne F Orentlicher, quoted in Nina Bernstein "Can War Reporters be 
Witnesses, Too?" (14 December 2002) The New York Times New York 
<http://loper.org/- george/trends/2002/Dec/75.html> (last accessed I 9 September 2003). 
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"reveals just how much the traditional concepts of the war correspondent 
have changed."30 The recent attempts to satisfy the demands for justice that 
arise from conflicts led the amici to ask the Appeals Chamber to use the 
opportunity provided by the case to set out a clear test with regard to 
"safeguarding journalists' rights. "
31 
In its decision, the Appeals Chamber emphasised that they were 
concerned with a particular group of journalists only, namely 'war 
correspondents.' 32 It considered that "society's interest in protecting the 
integrity of the newsgathering process is particularly clear and weighty" in 
the case of this group.33 In particular, this is due to the importance of their 
ability to awaken the international community to human rights abuses, 
which in tum has the potential to assist with bringing perpetrators to 
justice.34 Therefore, being satisfied that there was a public interest in the 
work of war correspondents, and that compelling them to testify would have 
an impact on their ability to carry out this work,
35 the Appeals Chan1ber 
asked "what test is appropriate to balance the public interest in 
accommodating the work of war correspondents with the public interest in 
having all relevant evidence available to the court and, where it is 
30 Bernstein, above. 
3 1 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (17 August 2002) "Brief Amici 
Curiae on Behalf of Various Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal's Appeal of 
Trial Chamber' s ' Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give 
Evidence"', para 20. 
32 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73 .9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 29. The Appeals Chamber 
defined war correspondents as being " individuals who, for any period of time, report (or 
investigate for the purposes of reporting) from a conflict zone on issues relating to the 
conflict." Although there may arise issues regarding who qualifies as a war correspondent 
for the purposes of this definition , and indeed there is considerable debate about the 
meaning of 'journalist' in domestic settings, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For general discussion regarding the definition of 'journalist' in terms of testimonial 
privileges see Clay Calvert "And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling with the 
Definition of' Journalist' in the Law" ( 1999) I 03 Die L Rev 411; Laurence B Alexander 
"Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering 
Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information" 
(2002) 20 Yale Land Poly Rev 97. 
33 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 36. 
34 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 36 (stating that " [t]he information 
uncovered by war correspondents has on more than one occasion provided important leads 
for the investigators of this Tribunal"). 
35 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 44. See Part V C 3 The impact of 
compelling testimony. 
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implicated, the right of the defendant to challenge the evidence against 
him?"36 
The test that was formulated was largely a watered-down version of 
that proposed by the amici,37 and places the burden on the subpoenaing 
party to show firstly that the evidence sought from a war correspondent "is 
of direct and important value in determining a core issue in the case," and 
secondly that the information cannot "reasonably be obtained elsewhere. "38 
In a separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen accepted the majority's 
test, but considered that in Randal' s situation his testimony would fail to 
satisfy the second limb of the test only.39 This was because the interpreter 
would be a reasonable alternative to requiring his testimony.40 In contrast, 
the majority indicated that it found it difficult to see how Randal's 
testimony could satisfy the first limb of the test due to his inability to speak 
Serbo-Croatian and therefore to confirm what had been said during the 
interview.41 As a result, the subpoena was overturned. 
D Application of the Appeals Chamber Test 
On 29 January 2003, the Prosecution filed a motion for a second 
subpoena of Randal. This provided the first opportunity for the application 
of the Appeals Chamber test.42 
36 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 34. 
37 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (l 7 August 2002) "Brief Amici 
Curiae on Behalf of Various Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal 's Appeal of 
Trial Chamber's 'Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give 
Evidence"', para 43. This test would require a showing that ajournalist's testimony "( I) is 
absolutely essential to the case; and (2) the information cannot be obtained by any other 
means." Where 'essential ' is defined as requiring that the contribution of the testimony 
must "be critical to determining the guilt or innocence ofa defendant." 
38 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73 .9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 50. War correspondents are 
not prevented from testifying voluntarily by this decision. 
39 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73 .9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 1 Judge Shahabuddeen. 
40 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 33 Judge Shahabuddeen. 
41 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Ta/ic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 ( 11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 54. 
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Although the Appeals Chamber had held that it was for the Trial 
Chamber to apply the test by examining the facts of a particular situation,
43 
its indication that it had difficulty seeing how Randal's testimony could 
satisfy the first limb proved influential.
44 Therefore, despite finding that the 
proposed testimony went to a core issue of the case,
45 
the Trial Chan1ber 
held that Randal's inability to speak Serbo-Croatian meant that not only 
could he not confirm the accuracy of the quotes, but he also could not 
reliably comment on the demeanour of the accused during the interview, 
since this required an understanding of what was actually being said.
46 
Thus 
the Prosecution had failed to satisfy the first limb of the Appeals Chamber 
test as the testimony could not be of 'direct and important value' to the issue 
of the accused's intent, and Randal was consequently not required to 
testify.47 
III FORMULATING RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 
The ad hoe tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda 
(ICTR) were created to prosecute violations of international humanitarian 
law that occurred in their respective territorial jurisdictions within a 
42 Prosecutor v Brdjanin Case No IT-99-36-T (30 June 2003, Trial Chamber 11) "Decision 
on Prosecution 's Second Request for a Subpoena of Jonathan Randal". 
43 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No 1T-99-36-AR73 .9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 54. 
44 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic (Second Request), above, para 29 (stating that it was 
"difficult to depart from the reasoning of the majority of the Appeals Chamber without 
having to anticipate an evaluation of evidence and facts which cannot be done at this 
particular stage or proceedings"). 
45 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic (Second Request), above, para 17 (this was because, " if 
accepted as true, the statements attributed to the accused in his article go to the accused's 
criminal responsibility, particularly his intent"). 
46 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic (Second Request), above, para 33. 
47 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic (Second Request), above, para 40. The Trial Chamber 
considered it unnecessary to resolve whether the evidence sought satisfied the second limb 
of the test. If it had, it may have come to the same conclusion as Judge Shahabuddeen, who 
considered that although the interpreter was also a journalist, " there was no reasonable 
alternative source so far as he was concerned," and therefore the requirements of this limb 
would also not be met in the case of Randal. Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-
99-36-AR73.9 (I I December 2002, Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", 
para 33 Judge Shahabuddeen. Based on the findings of the Trial Chamber, it would also 
seem that the subpoena of the interpreter would satisfy the first limb of the Appeals 
Chamber test due to their ability to directly confirm what was said in the interview. The 
decisions give no indication of the reasons for the interpreter not being subpoenaed instead 
of Randal. 
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particular timeframe.48 In fulfilling their mandates they were to apply the 
customary international law in existence at the time that the offences were 
cornmitted.49 With regard to how the trials were to be conducted, however, 
it was left to the tribunals to formulate their own rules of procedure and 
evidence. 50 An important and ongoing feature of their work is therefore the 
development of a distinct procedural system in the realm of international 
criminal law. The tribunals' approach to resolving procedural issues is 
crucial to ensuring the viability of the international criminal justice system. 
This is because the ad hoe tribunals, and the newly created International 
Criminal Court (ICC), depend on the support and co-operation of states in 
order to exist. 51 This cannot be enhanced, or in fact maintained, unless 
procedures are viewed as fair and principled, resulting in decisions that 
contribute to the legitimacy of the courts. 
A The Ability to Formulate Rules and the Applicable Sources of Law 
The governmg statutes of the international tribunals contain no 
evidentiary rules. 52 Instead, Article 15 of the ICTY Statute grants the judges 
48 Both Tribunals were established pursuant to Security Council Resolutions passed in 
accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which authorises the Council 
to take actions for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 
(ICTY) was established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 827 (25 May 1993) UN 
Doc S/Res/827 . The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/Res/955. 
49 "Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993)" (3 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, para 29. An important principle is therefore 
that ofnullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law). See Report of the Secretary 
General, para 34. 
50 Report of the Secretary General, above, para 83. Evidentiary privileges are a matter of 
procedure and evidence because they concern witness testimony. See Natasha A Affolder 
"Tadic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International Procedural Law" ( 1998) 
19 Mich J Intl L 445 , 473. 
5 1 See Jacob Katz Cogan "International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and 
Prospects" (2002) Yale J Intl L 111 , 119 (stating that " international criminal courts are 
dependent on other organisations - states, most importantly - to give them things. These 
things - money, evidence, access to evidence, defendants, witnesses, witness protection, 
court personnel, prison facilities, and the enforcement of orders and judgments - are all 
necessary for the courts ' success, and, indeed, without them, the courts could not operate or 
exist"). 
52 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended), 
adopted by and annexed to Security Council Resolution 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc 
S/Res/827 (hereinafter ICTY Statute); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, annexed to Security Council Resolution 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc 
S/Res/955 (hereinafter ICTR Statute). 
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the authority to "adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of 
the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of 
evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate 
matters."53 This saw the creation of a relatively skeletal series of rules, 
which were set out in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
The ability of the tribunals to determine their own procedural rules is 
not unusual in the international context,
54 and was a feature of both the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters concerning the prosecution of World War II 
war criminals.55 After they have been drafted, however, the issue of 
interpretation arises with regard to their application in particular situations. 
Apart from applying the wording of the Rules, including considering their 
purpose, the Tribunals must ensure that they are interpreted in a manner that 
is "consistent with the Statute as the constituent instrument of the 
International Tribunal and as the exclusive basis for its competence and 
authority."56 This is in line with the customary international law regarding 
53 ICTY Statute, art 15. Article I 4 of the JCTR Statute expressly adopts the rules of the 
ICTY for the purposes of the proceedings in the ICTR. 
54 Natasha A Affolder "Tadic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International 
Procedural Law" (1998) 19 Mich J Intl L 445, 470 (referring to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (26 June 1945) 59 Stat I 031, art 30, which provides that "the 
Court shall frame rules for carrying out its functions"). See also International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (7 March 1966) 660 UNTS 195, 
art I 0(1); American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) 9 ILM 673 , art 60; 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (25 March 1957) 295 UNTS 2, art 188; 
Statute of the International Law of the Sea, UNCLOS (1982) UN Doc A/CONF62/ 122, 
Annexe VI , art 16. 
55 Charter for the International Military Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (8 August 
1945) 82 UNTS 279, art 13 (granting the Tribunal the power to "draw up rules for its 
procedure ... not ... inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter."); Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (2 April 1946) TIAS 1589, art 7 (allowing 
the Tribunal to "draft and amend rules of procedure consistent with the fundamental 
provisions of this Charter."). The procedures adopted in the post-World War II tribunals are 
of little precedent value to the modern ad hoe tribunals. See Rod Dixon " Developing 
International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals" (I 997) Transnatl 
Land Contemp Prob 81 , 94 (stating that the Commission of Experts for the former 
Yugoslavia considered the "approach to evidentiary and procedural issues taken at 
Nuremberg, where there was an extremely high degree of reliance on documentary 
evidence and relatively little emphasis placed on the accused ' s right to full answer and 
defence, would not be acceptable today because of post-World War II developments in 
international human rights law"). See also Prosecutor v Tadic Case No IT-94-1 ( I O August 
1995, Trial Chamber) " Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective 
Measures for Victims and Witnesses", paras 20-22. 
56 Natasha A Affolder "Tadic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International 
Procedural Law" ( I 998) 19 Mich J Intl L 445, 467. See also Richard May and Mari eke 
Wierda "Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and 
Arusha" ( 1999) Col J Transnatl L 725 , 736; Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No JT-96-22-A 
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treaty interpretation, as contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which requires an examination of "the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms ... in their context and in light of its object and purpose."57 
The Tribunal has held that the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 
Vienna Convention are "relevant" to the interpretation of their governing 
documents. 58 
The generality of the Rules, however, indicates that they were not 
intended to be comprehensive, and can be seen to "deliberately invite an 
expansive interpretation to fill in the missing spaces."59 That there is a gap 
in the Rules with regard to evidentiary privileges, and journalists' privilege 
in particular, was recognised by the Appeals Chamber in Randal 's case 
when it stated that "[n]either the Statute nor the relevant rules offer much 
guidance on the issue being considered here. "60 Amendments to the Rules 
are permissible,61 and this has occurred on a number of occasions,62 but the 
Tribunals have often filled the gaps in direct response to the particular 
issues that arise in the cases before them. 63 The authority for this practice in 
the context of the rules of evidence is provided by Rule 89(8), which states 
that "in cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall 
apply rules of evidence that will best favour a fair determination of the 
(7 October 1997, Appeals Chamber) "Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Cassesse," 
para 2 ; Prosecutor v Kordic Case No IT-95-14/2 ( 18 September 2000, Appeals Chamber) 
" Decision on Appeal regarding the Admission into Evidence of Seven Affidavits and one 
Formal Statements" para 23 . 
57 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (22 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 , art 3 I. 
58 Prosecutor v Tadic Case No JT-94-1 ( I O August 1995, Trial Chamber) " Decision on the 
Prosecutor' s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses", para I 8. 
59 Rod Dixon " Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals" (1997) Transnatl Land Contemp Prob 81 , 95. 
60 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73 .9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 31. 
6 1 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 6 provides "(A) Proposals for amendment of the 
Rules may be made by a Judge, the Prosecutor or the Registrar and shall be adopted if 
agreed to by not less than ten permanent Judges at a plenary meeting of the Tribunal 
convened with notice of the proposal addressed to all Judges. (B) An amendment to the 
Rules may be otherwise adopted, provided it is unanimously approved by the permanent 
Judges." 
62 In fact , this has occurred 27 times since the Rules of Procedure and Evidence were 
adopted in 1994. 
63 Rod Dixon " Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals" ( 1997) Transnatl Land Contemp Prob 81 , 82. 
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matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the 
general principles oflaw."64 
The merit of the Tribunals being able to supplement the Rules 
through their decisions has been considered by a number of commentators.
65 
One position is that this allows for the creation of a distinct and workable 
system in the context of international justice:66 
"[L]awyers with trial experience will be left with a sense of frustration 
from the rules. They will find many lucanae, especially in the provisions 
relating to evidence . . . Fortunately, Rule 89(B), which allows the trial 
chambers to apply rules of evidence that will best favour a fair 
determination of the issues, offers to the Tribunal and the lawyers who 
appear before it a golden opportunity to craft a workable and just 
procedural and evidentiary regime that will foster the interests of 
international justice. Admittedly, this will require imagination, open-
mindedness, and patience." 
The approach that should be taken in creating such a regime, 
however, is unclear. In particular, there is uncertainty regarding the external 
sources that the Tribunals should consider in formulating rules, and the 
weight that should be accorded to these. Unlike the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice,67 the Statutes and Rules of the Tribunals 
contain no dedicated applicable law provision. 
64 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89(8). 
65 See Joseph L Falvey Jr "United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the 
Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1995) Fordham Intl L J 475, 518 (arguing that 
extensive rules, such as those governing the evidentiary process in military tribunals, are 
" unnecessary before a body such as the Tribunal and would only complicate the process."); 
Mercedeh Momeni " Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to 
Protect Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1997) 41 How L J 155, 159 
(stating that " it can be inferred that the Secretary General intended to establish a framework 
within which the Tribunal could operate effectively, while allowing the drafters of the 
Rules some licence to create the procedures for applying international humanitarian law 
that are acceptable to the international community.") Contrast Thomas Buergenthal , quoted 
in Dixon, above, 91 (arguing that the practice of developing rules ad hoe " tends to create a 
great deal of unnecessary confusion and probably also some unfairness, especially for those 
litigants who are represented by inexperienced counsel."). 
66 
Daniel D Ntanda Nsereko " Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" ( 1994) 5 Crim L F 507, 554. 
67 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (26 June 1945) 59 Stat I 031 , art 3 8( I) 
provides that the law to be applied in the Court shall be international conventions, 
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Although Rule 89(A) makes it clear that the Tribunals are not bound 
to apply national rules of evidence,68 Rules 89(B) advocates the 
consideration of general principles of law as derived from domestic 
systems.69 Such principles may be defined as "some proposition of law so 
fundamental that it will be found in virtually every legal system,"70 and their 
gap-filling function has been consistently recognised by courts operating in 
the international sphere. 71 In fact, the need to consider these principles may 
extend beyond the provision of Rule 89(B) if the intent of those creating the 
Rules is seen to be to ensure that they were based on the general principles 
underlying the major legal systems of the world. 72 
The Tribunals are also arguably restrained in their rulemaking by 
customary international law,73 and certainly by the need to have regard to 
the rights of the accused and the protection of victims and witnesses. 74 In 
considering these elements, and the procedural rules of other jurisdictions, 
the Chambers have emphasised the special circumstances within which they 
operate. These include the distinct legal and factual nature of the crimes that 
are being prosecuted, which are of a "scale and severity . . . never encountered 
international custom, general principles of law and, as a subsidiary means, judicial 
decisions and teachings. 
68 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89(A) provides: "A Chamber shall apply the rules 
of evidence set forth in this Section, and shall not be bound by national rules of evidence." 
69 The legislative history of Rule 89(8) reveals that "other sources were explicitly rejected 
in favour of general principles." Natasha A Affolder "Tactic, the Anonymous Witness and 
the Sources of International Procedural Law" ( 1998) 19 Mich J Intl L 445, 483 . 
70 Mark W Janis An Introduction to international law (3d ed, Aspen , New York, I 993) 55 . 
71 See generally Antonio Cassesse International law (Oxford, 2001) 158; Malcolm N Shaw 
international law (4th ed, Cambridge, 1997) 77-78. 
72 See Richard May and Marieke Wierda "Trends in International Criminal Evidence: 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha" ( 1999) Col J Transnatl L 725, 735. 
73 See Prosecutor v Simic Case No IT-95-9 (27 July 1999, Trial Chamber) " Ex Parte 
Confidential Decision on the Prosecution Motion under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning 
the Testimony ofa Witness", para 42 (stating that " the International Tribunal ' s Rules may 
be affected by customary international law," even where this is not express ly provided for 
in the Rules). Customary international law is generally defined as those principles which 
are evident in the practice of states, and which are widely accepted as being binding in law 
(otherwise known as "opinio juris"). See generally DJ Harris Cases and Materials on 
international law (5 th ed, Sweet & Maxwell , London, 1998) 23-45 . 
74 Article 20( I) of the ICTY Statute requires the Trial Chamber to "ensure that a trial is fair 
and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of 
procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for 
the protection of victims and witnesses." Articles 21 then sets out the fair trial rights of the 
accused, which are ' subject to ' the provision in art 22 for the protection of victims and 
witnesses. 
16 
m national prosecutions."75 That the conflict in Yugoslavia was ongoing 
during the ICTY's deliberations is also a factor that has been raised in the 
decisions of the Chambers, 76 as has the fact that there is no permanent 
police force or witness protection programme to support the work of the 
Tribunal,77 and that there has been a lack of cooperation from states in this 
context.78 Another characteristic unique to the Tribunals is the utilisation of 
both common and civil law aspects, which requires "innovative" approaches 
to rulemaking. 79 
It is therefore apparent that the Tribunals have sought to interpret 
their guiding documents with regard to its own context and "unique legal 
framework"80 in order to "mould its Rules and procedures to fit the task at 
hand."81 This can be seen as utilising an approach to interpretation, often 
applied in interpreting human rights instruments, that permits consideration 
of the meaning of documents with regard to what would be most suitable on 
policy grounds. 82 Thus Judge Shahabuddeen, in his decision in Randal 's 
case, stated that "[f]or scientific purposes, the Chamber may consult the 
experience of other judicial bodies and seek guidance from their responses 
to a corresponding situation, but its responsibility to exercise the power is its 
75 Rod Dixon " Developing lntemational Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals" ( 1997) Transnatl L and Contemp Prob 81 , 87. See also Patricia M Wald "To 
'Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence': The Use of Affidavit Testimony in 
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings" (2001) 42 Harv Intl L J 535,536 
(considering that prosecuting war crimes presents "unique problems" since the "definition 
of a war crime, a crime against humanity, or genocide itself requires proof of predicate 
conditions such as the existence of an international armed conflict, a nexus between the 
illegal acts alleged and an armed conflict, the occurrence ofa systematic or widespread 
campaign against civilians of which the alleged acts are part, or an intent to destroy a 
religious, ethnic, or racial group, in whole or in part"). See ICTY Statute, arts 2-5 for the 
elements of the crimes. 
76 See Prosecutor v Tadic Case No IT-94-1 ( I O August 1995, Trial Chamber) "Decision on 
the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses", para 
42 (stating that "[t]he situation of armed conflict that existed and endures in the area where 
the alleged atrocities were committed is an exceptional circumstance par excellence."). 
77 Prosecutor v Tadic, above, para 42. See also Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No 
IT-99-36-AR73.9 (I I December 2002, Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal", para 16 Judge Shahabuddeen (noting that "a domestic court is aided by the full 
apparatus of detection and enforcement by the state. By contrast, the Tribunal is not."). 
78 See Sara Stapleton "Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory 
Interpretation and the lmpermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 31 NYU J Intl Land Poly 
535, 542. 
79 See Prosecutor v Tadic, above, para 22. 
80 Prosecutor v Tadic, above, para 30. 
81 Prosecutor v Tadic, above, para 23 
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own; it may use the power as it sees fit even if its solution is at variance 
with that in some other legal system."83 
The lack of specific guidance in the Rules with regard to evidentiary 
privileges therefore does not mean that the tribunals lack authority to 
recognise any. Such a decision restricts the ability of the chambers to hear 
otherwise admissible testimony. In any court the admission of evidence is a 
key factor in determining the truth. The following section therefore sets out 
the unique approach of the international tribunals as this creates the 
particular climate for the recognition of a journalistic privilege. 
B The Admission of Evidence in the International Tribunals 
The distinction between common law and civil law systems is 
important to gaining an understanding of the purpose of the Tribunals' 
Rules as a unique procedural system.84 Essentially, they "represent a hybrid 
of Anglo-American adversarial trial practice and civil-continental 
procedures."85 That is, the presentation of evidence generally follows the 
adversarial model that is predominant in common law justice systems, with 
each party presenting their case and having the opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses and discredit the evidence of their opposition. 
86 Thus the 
82 Rod Dixon "Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals" ( 1997) Transnatl Land Contemp Prob 81, I O 1-102. 
83 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (I I December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 5 Judge Shahabuddeen. 
84 Dixon, above, 96; Gregory A Mcclelland "A Non-Adversary Approach To International 
Criminal Tribunals" (2002) 26 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev I, 13. 
85 Patricia M Wald "To 'Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence': The Use of 
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings" (2001) 42 Harv Intl 
L J 535, 537. See also Richard May and Marieke Wierda "Trends in International Criminal 
Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha" (1999) Col J Transnatl L 725,735. 
86 May and Wierda, above, 735 and 739. In particular, Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence reflects the dominance of the common law approach in this context. It states 
"(A) Each party is entitled to call witnesses and present evidence. Unless otherwise directed 
by the Trial Chamber in the interests of justice, evidence at the trial shall be presented in 
the following sequence: (i) evidence for the Prosecution; (ii) evidence for the defence; (iii) 
prosecution evidence in rebuttal ; (iv) defence evidence in rejoinder; (v) evidence ordered 
by the Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 98; and (vi) any relevant information that may assist 
the Trial Chamber in determining an appropriate sentence if the accused is found guilty on 
one or more of the charges in the indictment. (B) Examination-in-chief, cross-examination 
and re-examination shall be allowed in each case. It shall be for the party calling a witness 
to examine such witness in chief, but the Judge may at any stage put any question to the 
witness. (C) If the accused so desires, the accused may appear as a witness in his or her 
own defence." See also Rule 84 ("Opening Statements"), Rule 86 ("Closing Arguments"). 
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system "attempts to ascertain the truth through a clash of opposing 
viewpoints."87 This is in contrast to the civil law system where the conduct 
of the trial is "more akin to a detached factual investigation," and is 
therefore often described as 'inquisitorial. '
88 
The impact of civil law philosophy is more clearly evident in the 
rules regarding the admission of evidence, which are much broader than is 
generally associated with common law systems where there are often a 
number of opportunities for excluding evidence.
89 Under inquisitorial 
systems, rules governing admissibility leave wide discretion for judges, with 
relevancy and best evidence standards being the main test. 
90 This is 
reflected in Rule 89(C), which allows a Trial Chan1ber to "admit any 
relevant evidence that it deems to have probative value."
91 It is argued that 
such a liberal approach is necessary "for the full presentation of all the 
surrounding circumstances."92 Another rationale for granting the judges 
such discretion is that they are professional jurists who are "capable of 
according appropriate weight to evidence of varying reliability."
93 Thus the 
judges are able to admit any evidence that meets the standard set by Rule 
89(C), and then will determine the weighting to be accorded to it by 
The common law background of these rules is recognised in Prosecutor v Delalic Case No 
IT-96-21 (19 August 1998, Trial Chamber) "Decision on the Motion on Presentation of 
Evidence by the Accused." 
87 Gregory A McClelland "A Non-Adversary Approach To International Criminal 
Tribunals" (2002) 26 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev I, 1 I. See Prosecutor v Tadic Case No lT-
94-1-T (27 November 1996, Trial Chamber) "Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Vohrah on Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements", para 2. 
88 McClelland, above, I 1. Some features of the civil law system are evident in the approach 
of the Tribunals, for example in the fact that the trials are before a three-judge bench, as 
opposed to the jury trials of common law systems, and " in the defendant ' s right to give an 
unsworn and uncross-examined statement at the beginning of the trial , as well as to take the 
stand as an ordinary witness ; in the prosecutor' s right to appeal an acquittal ; and in greater 
leeway for judges questioning at trial or calling their own witnesses." Patricia M Wald "To 
' Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence': The Use of Affidavit Testimony in 
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings" (200 I) 42 Harv Intl L J 535 537. 
n - ' 
McClelland, above, 19. 
90 McClelland, above, 19; See also Richard May and Marieke Wierda "Trends in 
International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha" ( 1999) Col J 
Transnatl L 725, 727. 
91 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89(C). 
92 May and Wierda, above, 732. 
93 Gregory A McClelland "A Non-Adversary Approach To International Criminal 
Tribunals" (2002) 26 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev I, 30. See Prosecutor v Tadic Case No JT-
94-1 (5 August 1996) " Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay", para 17 (finding that 
trials in the international tribunals are "conducted by Judges who are able, by virtue of their 
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considering its probative value, particularly its reliability,94 in the context of 
all other evidence, and in light of the circumstances in which it was 
obtained. In particular, Rule 89(D) requires the judges to consider the rights 
of the accused in providing that "[a] Chamber may exclude evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair 
trial."95 
In a demonstration of the lenient admission standards of the 
tribunals, the Trial Chamber had earlier found Randal's article, his 
statement to the Prosecutor, and his proposed testimony to be prima facie 
admissible.96 This was despite the evidence being essentially hearsay since 
Randal had only been told of the content of Brdjanin' s responses through an 
intermediary. 97 Furthermore, in its application of the Appeals Chamber test, 
the Trial Chamber found that the word 'direct' in the first limb does not 
necessarily rule out the possibility that journalists' hearsay evidence may 
satisfy the test. Rather it appears to have accepted Judge Shahabuddeen' s 
approach of equating ' direct' with ' to the point.' 98 The impact of the 
Appeals Chamber test, however, can generally be seen as increasing the 
threshold for the subpoenaing of war correspondents from being that of 
simple admissibility of their evidence to requiring a higher showing of its 
importance. 99 
training and experience, to hear the evidence in the context in which it was obtained and 
accord it appropriate weight.") . 
94 The requirement of reliability has been found to be implicit in the definition of ' probative 
value.' See Prosecutor v Delalic Case No IT-96-21-T, (19 January 1998, Trial Chamber) 
"Decision on Motion of Prosecution for Admissibility of Evidence", para 20; Prosecutor v 
Aleksovski Case No IT-95-14/1 (16 February 1999, Appeals Chamber) " Decision on 
Prosecutor' s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence", para 15. 
95 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89(0). 
96 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber II) 
" Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para 5. 
97 Out of court statements such as hearsay evidence are generally inadmissible in common 
law systems due to the court being unable to adequately test their content. 
98 Prosecutor v Brdjanin Case No IT-99-36-T (30 June 2003 , Trial Chamber II) "Decision 
on Prosecution ' s Second Request for a Subpoena of Jonathan Randal", para 21 (referring to 
Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (II December 2002, Appeals 
Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 28 Judge Shahabuddeen). 
99 See Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Ta/ic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", paras 35-36 Judge Shahabuddeen. 
The approach of the Appeals Chamber suggests that a Trial Chamber will first need to 
consider the admissibility of the war correspondent' s evidence in terms of Rule 89(C), and 
then, if it finds in favour of this, to consider whether it also satisfies the Appeals Chamber 
test so as to overcome the privilege and allow the issuance of a subpoena. See Prosecutor v 
Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 ( 11 December 2002, Appeals Chamber) 
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IV THE LAW OF PRIVILEGE 
A The Traditional Law of Privilege 
Evidentiary, or testimonial, privileges allow for the non-disclosure 
of certain types of information, and therefore for persons to refuse to answer 
questions in a court of law. Although such rules are controversial because 
they are "counter-intuitive in a system designed to arrive at the truth," 
various privileges have developed over time as a means of "protecting 
interests and relationships considered sufficiently important to society to 
f . · · 1 ·d ,, I 00 warrant the loss o otherwise competent testimony or matena ev1 ence. 
John Henry Wigmore, in his respected and influential treatise on evidence, 
argued that any claims for a privilege must be strictly based on the benefits 
to society from recognising it, and a new evidentiary privilege should 
therefore meet the following criteria: 101 
(I) The communication must originate in confidence that it will not be 
disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community 
ought to be sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained by 
the correct disposal of litigation. 
" Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 32. The same process was not applied to Randal's 
article itself, however, which was deemed to admissible even in the absence of Randal 's 
testimony, with the weighting accorded to it to be determined in the final judgment of the 
court. See Prosecutor v Brdjanin Case No IT-99-36-T (30 June 2003, Trial Chamber II) 
" Decision on Prosecution 's Second Request for a Subpoena of Jonathan Randal", paras 41-
42. See Part V E The Residual Admission of Evidence. 
100 Anthony L Fargo "The Journalist's Privilege for Non-confidential Information in States 
with Shield Laws" ( 1999) 4 Comm Land Poly 325, 361. See also Karl H Schmid 
"Journalist's Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United States Courts of 
Appeals' Decisions from 1973 to 1999" (2002) 39 Am Crim L Rev 1441, 1448; Stephen 
Bates "The Reporter 's Privilege, Then and Now" (Research Paper R-23 , Harvard 
University, 2000) 3 <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspoVpublications/pdfs/ l 00831 %20R-
23 .pdf> (last accessed 29 September 2003). 
101 
8 John Henry Wigmore Evidence in Trials at Common Law (McNaughton rev ed, Little 
Brown & Co, Boston, 196 I) § 2285, 527. 
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A qualified, as opposed to an absolute, privilege therefore allows a 
litigant to overcome the presumption of a privilege by proving an overriding 
need or interest in the information that outweighs the interest in preventing 
disclosure. 
The Rules and decisions of the tribunals make prov1s1on for 
protective measures for victims and witnesses. 102 This is a separate matter 
from evidentiary privileges. The basic rationale for protective measures in 
situations where testifying will likely result in threats to personal safety, or 
where witnesses are unable to confront the accused for psychological 
reasons resulting from their experiences, is that such people will be more 
willing to testify. 103 Privileges, on the other hand, establish a presumption 
against testifying at all, with the rationale being to protect a public interest 
that would be affected by members of a particular class testifying on certain 
matters. In Randal 's case, the public interest asserted was that arising from 
the ability of war correspondents to obtain and impart information of 
concern to the international community. The formulation of a privilege in 
this case is not the only privilege that has been recognised by the 
international tribunals. 
B Other Evidentiary Privileges in the International Tribunals 
The Statutes and Rules of the tribunals set out two privileges that 
have long been recognised in common law jurisdictions. The traditional 
lawyer-client privilege applies by virtue of Rule 97. 104 This is an absolute 
privilege that can only be waived in limited circumstances. 105 
102 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 22. The most important deci sion in relation to 
this provision is the Tadic Protective Measures decision. This decision set out the matters to 
consider in determining whether to provide certain measures to protect witnesses, including 
anonymity and testimony by video link. See Prosecutor v Tadic Case No IT-94-1 (10 
August 1995, Trial Chamber) "Decision on the Prosecutor' s Motion Requesting Protective 
Measures for Victims and Witnesses", para 71. 
103 See Prosecutor v Tadic, above, para 3. 
104 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 97 provides that " [a]ll communications between 
lawyer and client shall be regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to disclosure 
at trial." 
105 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 97. These circumstances are "(i) the client 
consents to such disclosure; or (ii) the client has voluntarily disclosed the content of the 
communication to a third party, and that third party then gives evidence of that disclosure." 
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The privilege against self-incrimination is set out as a basic fair trial 
right in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute. 106 There is also some protection for 
witnesses provided by Rule 90(E). If a witness is compelled to answer 
questions that might tend to incriminate them, then such testimony cannot 
be used in a subsequent prosecution of that witness. 
107 
Although the Rules do not provide for them, the ICTY has 
recognised evidentiary privileges for state officials, 
108 the Commander of 
the United Nations Special Forces, 109 tribunal officials, 
110 and for the 
personnel of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
111 In the 
latter case, the Trial Chamber found that the important role of the ICRC is 
recognised in customary international law, 112 and that the ability to carry out 
its functions depends on its workers maintaining perceptions of their 
neutrality and independence in conflict zones, 113 and on their honouring of 
promises of confidentiality. 114 
The absolute privilege for ICRC personnel is intrinsically connected 
to international humanitarian law and international justice, and is justified 
106 I CTY Statute, art 21 (g) provides that a defendant has the right "not to be compelled to 
testify against himself or to confess guilt." See also JCTR Statute, art 20. 
'
07 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 90(E). 
'
08 Prosecutor v 8/askic Case No IT-95-14-AR (29 October 1997, Appeals Chamber) 
"Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for a Review of the Decision of Trial 
Chamber II of 18 July 1997", paras 38 and 43 (finding that " both under international law 
and the Statute itself, Judges or Trial Chambers cannot address binding orders to State 
officials."). The Tribunal can, however, issue binding orders and requests to the State itself 
in accordance with article 29 of the ICTY Statute. 
'
09 Prosecutor v Blaskic Case No. IT-95-21-AR (12 May 1999, Trial Chamber) "Decision 
of Trial Chamber l on Protective Measures for General Philippe Morillon , Witness of the 
Trial Chamber." 
''
0 Prosecutor v Delalic Case No. IT-96-21-T (8 July 1997, Trial Chamber) " Decision on 
the Motion Ex Parte by the Defence of Zdravko Mucic Concerning the Issue of a Subpoena 
to an Interpreter", para 20 (finding that it is an " important consideration in the 
administration of justice to insulate the interpreter or other functionaries of the International 
Tribunal from constant apprehension of the possibility of being personally involved in the 
arena of the conflict, on either side, in respect of matters arising from the discharge of their 
duties. On both these grounds, the interests of justice frowns upon any of the parties being 
able to call an interpreter as a witness."). 
111 Prosecutor v Simic Case No. IT-95-9-PT (27 July 1999, Trial Chamber) "Ex Parte 
Confidential Decision on the Prosecution 's Motion under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning 
the Testimony of a Witness." 
112 Prosecutor v Simic, above, paras 46-50, 72. 
113 P s· · b 52 rosecutor v 11nic, a ove, para . 
114 Prosecutor v Simic, above, para 56. 
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by the need to protect the strong public interest in the work of the ICRC. 
That there is a public interest in protecting the newsgathering ability of 
journalists is similarly recognised in the domestic realm, where various 
formulations of journalistic privilege have arisen through an application of 
Wigmore's criteria, in statutes, and by virtue of constitutional guarantees of 
the right to freedom of expression. 
C Journalists' Privilege in Other Jurisdictions 
Although there is some uncertainty with regard to the impact on the 
judges' rulemaking powers resulting from general principles of law, in cases 
of first instance such as Randal 's case it is important to consider the 
approaches of other jurisdictions that have dealt with similar issues. That 
this is the case is evident from the fact that the Rules of the Tribunals seek 
to incorporate the principles of various legal systems, and particularly from 
the reference to general principles of law in Rule 89(B). Regardless of 
whether general principles "override the discretion of the judges in making 
procedural rules," 115 or whether they are only required to consider their 
'spirit' under Rule 89(B), the Tribunal could justifiably examine "[a] 
combination of rules of different countries, which have crystallised into a 
general rule; a particular rule from one or more countries that is reflective of 
a more general rule; or the reasoning underpinning such rules." 1 16 The 
following therefore seeks to determine the content of these aspects in 
relation to journalistic privilege as derived from the approaches of other 
jurisdictions. 
I The United States of America 
The United States has the most developed jurisprudence regarding 
journalistic privilege. Although the courts were historically against the 
11 5 Natasha A Affolder "Tadic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources oflnternational 
Procedural Law" (1998) 19 Mich J Intl L 445 , 495. 
11 6 Rod Dixon "Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals" ( 1997) Transnatl Land Contemp Prob 81 , 99. 
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recognition of a journalistic privilege under common law, 
117 and on the 
basis of the Constitution's First Amendment right to freedom of 
expression, 118 a majority of states provided varying degrees of protection for 
journalists through the creation of 'shield laws' that were contained in 
statutes. 119 There was discussion at the federal level regarding the creation 
of such a law, but this never eventuated. 120 What did arise were guidelines 
set out by the Justice Department that govern the practice of federal 
prosecutors in respect to subpoenaing journalists.
121 It was these guidelines 
that largely provided the basis for the tests provided by both Randal and the 
amici in their submissions to the ICTY. 122 They require prosecutors to 
117 Journalists ' claims to privilege based on professional ethics and duties to sources were 
rejected by the courts. See, for example, Plunkett v. Hamilton (I 9 I I) 70 S E 781, 785-786 
(Ga) 
118 US Constitution, amendment I states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech." A journalist first claimed a privilege against revealing sources based 
on the First Amendment in 1958, and the court rejected this. Garland v. Torre (1958) F 2d 
545 (2d Cir). 
119 Ala Code§ 12-21-142 (Supp 1998); Alaska Stat § 09.25.300-09.25.390 (Michie 1998); 
Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 12-2237 (Supp 1999); Ark Code Ann § 16-85-510 (Michie I 987); Cal 
Evid Code § 1070 (Supp 2000); Colo Rev Stat § I 3-90-1 19 (Bradford 1999); Del Code 
Ann, title 10, § 4320-4326 (Michie 1999); DC Code Ann§ 16-4701 to 16-4704 (Supp 
1998); Fla Stat Ann § 90.5015 (Supp 2000); Ga Code Ann § 24-9-30 (Supp 1999); Ill 
Comp Stat Ann § 5/8-901 to 5/8-909 (Supp 1999); Ind Code Ann § 34-46-4-1 to 34-46-4-2 
(Westlaw 1999); Ky Rev Stat Ann § 421.100 (Supp. 1999); La Rev Stat Ann § 1451-1459 
(Supp 2000); Mich. Comp Laws§ 767.5a (Supp 1999); Minn Stat Ann§ 595.021 to 
595.025 (Supp 2000); Mont Code Ann § 26-1-90 I to 26-1-902 (Supp 1999); Neb Rev Stat 
§ 20-144 to 20-147 (Supp 1997); Nev Rev Stat § 49.275 (Supp 1999); NC Gen Stat § 8-
53.11 (Supp 1999); ND Cent Code § 31-01-06.2 (Supp 1999); NJ Stat Ann § 2A:84A-2 l to 
2A:84A-21.13 (Westlaw 1994); NM Evid Rules§ 11-514 (Michie 1994); NY Civ Rights 
Law§ 79-h (Supp 1999); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2739.04 and 2739.12 (Supp 1999); Okla 
Stat Ann title 12, § 2506 (Westlaw 1993); Or Rev Stat Ann§ 44.5 10 to 44.540 (Supp 
1998); 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5942 (Supp 1999); RI Gen Laws § 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 
( 1998); SC Code Ann § 19-1 I - I 00 (Supp 1999); Tenn Code Ann § 24-1-208 (Supp 1999). 
The first shield law was passed in Maryland in 1896. A common requirement in these state 
laws is that the information sought must be "critical or necessary" to a claim. 
120 See generally Mark Neubauer "The Newsman's Privilege after Bran::burg: The Case for 
a Federal Shield Law" ( 1976) 24 UCLA L Rev 160. 
121 28 CFR § 50.10. The regulations were announced on I O August 1970, in a speech by 
Attorney General John N Mitchell , and a version of the regulations was circulated a month 
later before they were formally included as part of the Code of Federal Regulations on 16 
October 1973. See Adam Liptak "The Hidden Federal Shield Law: On the Justice 
Department's Regulations Governing Subpoenas to the Press" (1999) Ann Surv Am L 227, 
232. The regulations require that the Attorney General must give authorisation before a 
subpoena is issued. See 28 CFR § 50.IO(e). They are not intended to be enforced by the 
courts. See Shain v long (I 992) F 2d 850, 854 (4th Cir). Arguably, however, they serve as a 
"shadow federal shield law." Liptak, above, 236. 
122 The guidelines require that "all reasonable attempts should be made to obtain 
information from alternative sources." 28 CFR § 50.1 O(b ). They also state that subpoenas 
"should not be used to obtain peripheral , nonessential , or speculative information." § 
50.1 O(t)(2). Furthermore, as reflected in the proposal of the amici in Randal 's case, they 
require, in the context of criminal trials, that "there should be reasonable grounds to 
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"strike a proper balance between the public's interest in the free 
dissemination of ideas and information and the public's interest in effective 
law enforcement and the fair administration of justice." 123 
The Justice Department guidelines were formulated during a period 
of considerable civil unrest that saw police and prosecutors rely heavily on 
journalists for information about dissident groups. 124 It was at this time that 
the first, and only, journalists' privilege case was heard by the United States 
Supreme Court. 125 In deciding not to recognise a qualified privilege for 
journalists, Justice White' s majority judgment in Branzburg v Hayes put 
considerable emphasis on the "longstanding principle that 'the public ... has 
a right to every man ' s evidence."' 126 It was held that the First Amendment 
did not invalidate any "incidental burdening" of the press caused by the 
enforcement of laws that applied to all citizens, 127 and therefore that 
journalists' must "respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of 
a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial," unless they could show 
that the subpoena was issued in bad faith. 128 
Justice Powell provided a concurrmg opinion. 129 It was an 
interesting concurrence, however, in that while it did not explicitly go 
against the majority, 130 it also clearly supported a journalistic privilege in 
believe ... that the information sought is essential to a successful investigation - particularly 
with reference to directly establishing guilt or innocence." § 50.1 O(t)(2). 
123 28 CFR § 50.1 O(a). The guidelines also require negotiations to be conducted with the 
media agency or journalist concerned. See§ 50.1 O(c). 
124 See Karl H Schmid "Journalist 's Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of 
United States Courts of Appeals' Decisions from 1973 to 1999" (2002) 39 Am Crim L Rev 
1441, 1449-1450. 
125 Bran::burg v Hayes ( I 972) 408 US 665. This case resulted from the consolidation of 
three cases on appeal from federal appellate courts: Caldwell v United States ( 1970) 434 F 
2d 1981 (9 th Cir) (in which a First Amendment privilege was recognised by an appellate 
court for the first time); Branz burg v Pound (1971) 46 I S W 2d 345 (Ky) and Bran::burg v 
Meigs ( 1971) 503 S W 2d 748 (Ky) (these two cases were heard together at the federal 
appeal level , where the court held that the state shield law did not apply where the journalist 
had been a witness to criminal activity); and In Re Pappas (1971 ).266 N E 2d 297 (Mass). 
126 Bran::burg v Hayes, above, 686 Justice White (quoting 8 John Henry Wigmore Evidence 
in Trials at Common law (McNaughton rev ed, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1961) § 
2192). 
127 Branzburg v Hayes, above, 682-683 Justice White. 
128 Bran::burg v Hayes, above, 690-691 Justice White. 
129 This meant that the three judges who joined Justice White achieved a 4-1-4 majority 
against the recognition of a journalistic privilege. 
130 See Bran::burg v Hayes, above, 709 Justice Powell (agreeing with the majority that 
where a journalist suspected that they were called to testify for the purpose of harassment or 
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certain situations. He suggested that "if the newsman is called upon to give 
information bearing only a remote or tenuous relationship to the subject of 
the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony 
implicates a confidential source relationship without legitimate need of law 
enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to quash." 131 Each 
claim should therefore be judged on a case-by-case basis involving the 
balancing of the competing interests of freedom of the press and the duty to 
testify. 132 Thus Justice Powell concluded that "the courts will be available to 
the newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment 
interests require protection." 133 
The main dissenting judgment was that of Justice Stewart, 134 who 
argued that the decision of the majority would lead authorities to "annex the 
journalistic profession as an investigative arm of the government," therefore 
endangering the media's autonomy. 135 He held that the right of journalists to 
protect confidential sources was rooted in the essential societal interest in 
the "full and free flow of information to the public." 136 He therefore set out 
a three-pronged test, which required the following elements to be shown 
before ajournalist was subpoenaed: 137 
(1) that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has 
information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of 
law; 
(2) that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means 
less destructive of First Amendment rights; and 
(3) a compelling and overriding interest in the information. 
Despite the majority's finding that no First Amendment-based 
privilege existed, in ten of the twelve circuits federal appeals courts have 
otherwise in bad faith then they could claim constitutional protection in order to quash a 
subpoena). 
13 1 Bran::.burg v Hayes, above, 710 Justice Powell. 
132 Bran::.burg v Hayes, above, 709-710 Justice Powell. 
133 Bran::.burg v Hayes, above, 710 Justice Powell. 
134 
A separate dissenting opinion was written by Justice Douglas who argued that the 
journalist' s privilege should be absolute. See Bran::.burg v Hayes above 712. 
135 ' ' Bran::.burg v Hayes, above, 725 Justice Stewart. 
136 Bran::.burg v Hayes, above, 725 Justice Stewart. 
137 Bran::.burg v Hayes, above, 743 Justice Stewart. 
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explicitly recognised such a privilege. 138 While some have done so by 
interpreting Branzburg as being restricted to situations involving grand jury 
subpoenas for direct eyewitness testimony, 139 others have extended a 
privilege even in these instances, primarily through a reading of Justice 
Powell's concurring opinion as supporting a more general journalistic 
privilege. 140 In setting out the factors to be considered in balancing the First 
Amendment interests and the needs of justice, some courts have established 
tests very similar to that proposed by Justice Stewart. 141 
In some jurisdictions, the factors or tests that are considered in cases 
involving confidential sources are similarly applied where the information 
sought is non-confidential in nature. 142 For example, where the information 
will not reveal details leading to the discovery of a source, but has 
nevertheless not been made publicly available, or where the journalist was 
an eyewitness and so could potentially provide additional information 
without breaking promises of confidentiality. These courts generally 
consider that the "chilling effect" of disclosure is the same regardless of the 
type of information sought, 143 yet other decisions have applied a lower 
138 In particular, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, 
also the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, although the results are less clear in these latter two 
jurisdictions. For detailed information and analysis of the law relating to journalists' 
privilege in the United States see the website of the Reporters ' Committee for Freedom of 
the Press <www.rcfp.org/privilege> (last accessed 15 August 2003). 
139 See United States v Cutler ( 1993) 6 F 3d 67 (2d Cir); United States v Steel hammer 
( 1976) 539 F 2d 273 (4th Cir); United States v Smith ( I 998) 135 F 3d 963, 968, 971-972 (5 th 
Cir); Re Grand Jwy Proceedings (Scarce v United States) (1993) 5 F 3d 397, 400 (91h Cir). 
140 See United States v The LaRouche Campaign ( 1988) 841 F 2d 1176, 1179 ( I st Cir); 
LaRouche v National Broadcasting Co ( 1986) 780 F 2d 1134 ( 4th Cir); Farr v Prichess 
(1975) 522 F 2d 464, 468 (9th Cir). 
141 See United States v Burke ( 1983) 700 F 2d 70 (2d Cir); Riley v City of Chester ( 1979) 
612 F 2d 708, 716-717 (3d Cir); Shoen v Shoen (1995) 5 F 3d 1289 (9th Cir); Silkwood v 
Kerr-McGee Corp ( 1977) 563 F 2d 433, 438 ( I 0th Cir) United States v Caporale ( 1986) 806 
F 2d 1487, 1504 ( 11 th Cir); Maughan v NL Industries ( 1981) 524 F Supp 93, 95 (DC Cir). 
142 See Church of Scientology (1993) 992 F 2d 1329 (4 th Cir); Loadholt::: v Fields (1975) 
389 F Supp 1299, 1303 (MD Fla); Kidwell v McCutcheon, (1996) 962 F Supp 1477, 1480 
(SO Fla); Maughan v NL industries (1981) 524 F Supp 93, 95 (DC Cir). The Justice 
Department guidelines, and a number of state shield laws, also do not differentiate between 
confidential and non-confidential information. For an overview of the law regarding the 
journalists' privilege for non-confidential information see Anthony L Fargo " Reconsidering 
the Federal Journalist's Privilege for Non-Confidential Information: Gon:::ales v NBC' 
(2001) 19 Cardozo Arts and Ent L J 355. 
143 See von Bulow by Auersperg v von Bulow (I 987) 811 F 2d 136, 145 (2d Cir) (stating 
that there is no particular difference between the need to protect confidential and non-
confidential information); United States v Cuthbertson ( 1980) 630 F 2d 139, 147 (3d Cir) 
(holding that any forced disclosure of information could " undercut the public policy 
favouring the free flow of information to the public."); Loadholt::: v Fields ( 1975) 389 F 
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threshold for overcoming the First Amendment-based privilege in cases 
where non-confidential information is sought, or have otherwise considered 
this a factor in a balancing exercise. 144 Some courts have also held that no 
privilege exists unless confidential sources are involved. 145 As a result, the 
law in this area is very uncertain at the federal level. 
In criminal cases, it may be said that although a privilege is still 
available on the basis of First Amendment guarantees, particular interests 
concerning the administration of justice might outweigh this. 146 Despite the 
fact that the interests of defendants, in terms of due process rights, are 
guaranteed by the Constitution, 147 one commentator has found that the tests 
applied by the federal appeals courts often depend on the identity of the 
subpoenaing party, and actually make it more difficult for defendants to 
obtain information from journalists compared to the prosecution. 148 
Supp 1299, 1303 (MD Fla) (stating that "compelled production of a reporter's resource 
materials is equally as invidious as the compelled disclosure of his confidential 
informants," and that the "chilling effect" on the flow of information was equally as 
harmful even without the presence of a confidential source); Maughan v NL Industries 
( I 98 I) 524 F Supp 93, 95 (DC Cir) (noting that compelling a reporter to produce notes no 
doubt constitutes a "significant intrusion into and certainly a chilling effect upon the 
newsgathering and editorial process," and thus "compelled production of materials is 
equally as invidious as the compelled disclosure of ... confidential informants."). 
144 United States v The laRouche Campaign (1981) 841 F 2d I 176, 1181 (1 st Cir); Russo v 
Geagan ( 1983) 35 Fed R Serv 2d 1403 (D Mass); Gonzales v National Broadcasting Co 
(1999) 194 F 3d 29 (2d Cir); Doe v Kohn, Nast and Gra/(1994) 853 F Supp 147, 149-150 
(ED Pa); Warnell v Ford Motor Co (I 998) 183 FRO 624, 625 (ND 111); Shoen v Shoen 
( 1995) 5 F 3d 1289 (9th Cir). 
145 See Lynch v Riddell (1982) 35 Fed R Serv 2d 185 (D Mass); United States v Smith 
( I 998) 135 F 3d 963, 971 (5u, Cir). 
146 See Parsons v Watson (1991) 778 F Supp 214, 218 (D Del); Re Shain (1992) 978 F 2d 
850 (4th Cir); United States v Jennings (21 June 1999) 97 CR 765, WL 438984 (ND Ill); 
Farr v Prichess (1975) 522 F 2d 464,468 (9 th Cir); United States v Hubbard, (I 979) 493 F 
Supp 202,205 (DC Cir). In the only case where the special position of war correspondents 
has been raised, the district court in United States v Lindh (2002) 210 F Supp 2d 780 (ED 
Va) considered this to be a "novel argument," but found that the journalist's testimony was 
material to a "non-frivolous" issue, and further that the asserted privilege was outweighed 
by the need to protect the defendant's fair trial rights. 
147 
US Constitution, amendment VI provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." 
148 
Karl H Schmid "Journalist's Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United 
States Courts of Appeals' Decisions from 1973 to 1999" (2002) 39 Am Crim L Rev 1441, 
1458. Schmid argues that in the majority of cases where the subpoenaing party has been 
either the prosecutor or a grand jury, the courts have applied Justice White ' s bad faith 
requirement, which places the burden on the journalist to show that a privilege should 
apply. This is in contrast to the approach used in the majority of cases where the defendant 
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2 United Kingdom/Europe 
As indicated above, the common law has never recognised the 
existence of a specific public interest privilege for journalists. 149 In the 
United Kingdom, a statutory qualified privilege for journalists' confidential 
sources is set out in the Contempt of Court Act 1981 : 150 
No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of 
contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information 
contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it is 
established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in 
the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of 
disorder or crime. 
The most significant case regarding the application of this rule is 
Goodwin v United Kingdom. 151 The plaintiff journalist took his complaint to 
the European Court of Human Rights arguing that his right to freedom of 
expression, as guaranteed by article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 152 had been restricted in violation of that article by the order 
of the domestic court that he reveal a confidential source, and its subsequent 
finding of contempt when he refused to do so. 153 
has requested the information, where the courts have preferred either a flexible balancing 
test or one similar to Justice Stewart's three-pronged test, which place some or all of the 
burden on the shoulders of the subpoenaing party, and which generally result in a higher 
threshold for ordering journalists' testimony. 
149 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence law: Privilege (NZLC PP23 , Wellington, 
1994) 135. See Attorney General v Mulholland [ 1963] 1 All ER 767 (CA); British Steel 
Corp v Granada Television Ltd [ 1981] AC I 096 (HL). 
15° Contempt of Court Act 1981, s I 0. 
151 Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123 . 
152 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ( 4 
November 1950) 213 UNTS 222 (hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights). 
Article I 0( I) provides: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers ." It is uncertain whether s I 0 
was formulated in recognition of the United Kingdom 's obligation to protect freedom of 
expression as a result of its ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights. But 
see Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 193, 203 (HL) (stating that 
"whatever was the objective of those promoting s I 0, there can be no doubt now that both s 
I O and art 10 have a common purpose in seeking to enhance the freedom of the press by 
protectingjournalistic sources."). 
153 X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) Ltd and Ors [1991] I AC I (HL). 
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Finding that forced disclosure of confidential sources was a 
restriction of the right to freedom of expression, 154 the Court went on to 
consider the permissibility of such a limitation and therefore whether 
disclosure was "justified by an overriding public interest." 155 The criteria 
used were those which had been applied in earlier cases, and which are 
derived from the wording of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The limitation on the right must be provided by law, pursue a legitimate 
aim, and be "necessary in a free and just society." 156 This final criteria has 
been interpreted to require that the "pressing social need" for the restriction 
must be "convincingly established," and that the measures taken must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 157 The Court found that, in the 
circumstances of the Goodwin case, there was not a "reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the legitimate aim pursued by the disclosure 
order and the means deployed to achieve that aim" since the party seeking 
disclosure had already obtained other measures to protect their interests. 158 
Thus the restriction of the right to freedom of expression arising from the 
particular application of the statute in this situation was not permissible 
under the article 10. 
Domestic courts have subsequently applied the reasoning m 
Goodwin, but it can generally be seen that even with the additional 
requirements that result from the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the threshold that disclosure be "necessary in the interests of justice" is quite 
154 Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EH RR 123, para 70. The court held that 
"[p ]rotection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions of press 
freedom . .. Without such protections, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in 
informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result, the vital public watchdog 
role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and 
reliable information may be adversely affected." 
155 Goodwin v United Kingdom, above, para 70. 
156 Article I 0(2) provides that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression "may be 
subject to such formalities , conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a free and democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary." 
157 See Handyside v United Kingdom (1980) 1 EHRR 737, para 50; The Sunday Times v 
United Kingdom ( 1980) 2 EHRR 245 , para 59. 
158 Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, para 46. 
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low. 159 The courts have not set out a clear standard regarding the weight of 
the public interest in the free flow of information, instead finding that the 
level of public interest will vary from case to case, as will the strength of the 
interest in disclosure. 160 One factor that has been considered in a number of 
cases, however, is whether the person seeking disclosure has made attempts 
to obtain the evidence through other means. 161 
I New Zealand and Australia 
In New Zealand and Australia the courts "have not worked out a 
coherent policy to deal with the protection of journalists' sources." 162 There 
are a number of overlapping rules that might apply depending on the 
circumstances, but ultimately the discretion is with the court to compel 
disclosure or not. At common law, the so-called 'newspaper rule', which 
applied in the United Kingdom prior to the enactment of the broader rule in 
the Contempt of Court Act, 163 can prevent disclosure in the limited 
circumstances of preliminary motions for discovery in defamation actions 
where a member of the press is a party. 164 This protection does not extend to 
the trial, despite findings that the overriding justification for the newspaper 
rule is the public interest in the dissemination of information, 165 which 
159 Despite the finding in Goodwin, above, para 45 that " it will not be sufficient, per se, for 
a party seeking disclosure of a source to show merely that he or she will be unable without 
disclosure to exercise a legal right or avert the threatened legal wrong on which he or she 
bases his or her claim in order to establish the necessity of disclosure," recent decisions 
have found an exceptional need for the information to be shown in situations where a party 
requires disclosure in order to bring an action. See John and Ors v Express Newspapers pie 
and Ors [2000] 3 All ER 257 (CA); Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 4 All 
ER 193 (HL). 
160 See Jnterbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd and Ors [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 542, para 32. 
Some factors to consider are " the nature of the confidence (if any) placed by the source in 
the press, whether his communication to the press can reasonably be considered by him and 
by the public at large as having been made in the expectation of the preservation of 
confidentiality, the apparent purpose for his communication to the press and the public 
interest in shielding that source from exposure." 
161 See John and Ors v Express Newspapers pie and Ors [2000] 3 All ER 257 (CA); 
Saunders v Punch Ltd [ 1998] 1 All ER 234 (CA). 
162 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence law: Privilege (NZLC PP23 , Wellington, 
1994) 132. 
163 See Attorney-General v Clough [1963] I All ER 420 (QB). 
164 See Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries Ltd [ 1980] I 
NZLR 163 (CA); Brill v Television Service One [1976] 1 NZLR 683 (HC); European 
Pacific Banking Corporation v Forth Estate Publications Ltd [ 1993] 1 NZLR 559 (CA). 
165 Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries Ltd, above, 180. 
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would seemingly be affected by disclosure regardless of the stage in the 
proceedings. 
The New South Wales Supreme Court has held that the policy 
considerations underlying the newspaper rule do not automatically apply in 
situations other than defamation proceedings. 166 In fact, the Australian 
courts put little emphasis on the effect of forced disclosure on freedom of 
expression, finding that there is very limited constitutional guarantee of such 
a right. 167 The judge referred to the case of John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v 
Cojunagco, in which the court had found strongly against the existence of a 
journalistic privilege, stating that "there is a paramount interest in the 
administration of justice which requires that cases be tried by courts on the 
relevant and admissible evidence," and that "[t]he role of the media in 
collecting and disseminating information to the public does not give rise to a 
public interest" which can be allowed to prevail over this. 168 
Such statements reveal the impact of Wigmore's criteria for the 
formulation of a new privilege, 169 as do the statutory provisions of the two 
countries. 170 In New Zealand, journalists might be able to claim a privilege 
for confidential communications under the general privilege provision of 
section 35 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980. 171 This provision 
places the burden on the party seeking to withhold information to satisfy the 
court that the public interest in disclosure is outweighed by the public 
166 NRMA v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (26 June 2002) NSWSC 563 4454/01 
MacReady M. 
167 See Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560-562. This 
guarantee has been found to be important in situations involving communication about 
government or political matters, but the courts have indicated that the level of protection it 
is not particularly high where other matters are concerned. See also NRMA vJohn Fai1fax 
Publications Pty Ltd, above. 
168 John Fairfax and Sons Ltd v Cojuangco ( 1988) 165 CLR 346, 354. 
169 
See Donald L Mathieson (ed) Cross on Evidence (7 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 
338. 
170 
Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980, s 35 (New Zealand); In Australia, the Evidence 
Act 1995, ss l 26A- l 26B (NSW) is the only one containing a general privilege provision. 
Other statutes contain specific provisions for particular communications where there is 
considered to be a public interest in limiting disclosure. See Evidence Act 1977, ss 10-14 
(Qld) ; Evidence Act 1958, ss 26-32 (Vic); Evidence Act 1995, ss 117-128 (Cth). 
171 
Privacy Act 1993, s 28( I )(g) also provides limited protection for journalists, but only 
extends to the ability of state broadcasters (Radio New Zealand Ltd and Television New 
Zealand Ltd) to refuse to disclose sources of information where this information was 
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interest in preserving particular confidences. In determining this courts can 
take into account: 172 
(a) The likely significance of the evidence to the resolution of the issues 
to be decided in the proceeding; (b) The nature of the confidence and of 
the special relationship between the confidant and the witness ; (c) The 
likely effect of the disclosure on the confidant or any other person. 
The New Zealand Law Commission considered that, with regard to 
the application of this section to journalists, the courts should not require 
that the public interest in freedom of the press and the confidentiality of its 
sources be established in each case. Instead, the "free flow of information 
( and, by implication, the freedom of the press) should be declared a matter 
of public interest" covered by the section. 173 The Commission therefore did 
not consider that there was a need for a separate provision for journalists as 
the existing section could be applied to them. It did, however, recommend 
additional guidelines in respect of protecting journalists' sources. These 
were that "alternative avenues should be exhausted before ordering a 
journalist to disclose; a court should take into account the nature of the 
proceeding, such as whether it is criminal or civil ; and it should also 
consider whether disclosure can occur in a manner which limits publication, 
such as through inspection by the court or name suppression." 174 
received in confidence, or where disclosure would prejudice the future supply of such 
information. 
172 Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980, s 35 . The Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) is more 
detailed with regard to these considerations. Under s 1268(4) the court can consider: "(a) 
the probative value of the evidence in the proceeding; (b) the importance of the evidence in 
the proceeding; (c) the nature and gravity of the relevant offence, cause of action or defence 
and the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding, the availability of other evidence 
concerning the matters to which the protected confidence or protected identity information, 
including the likelihood of harm, and the nature and extent of harm that would be caused to 
the protected confider; (f) the means . .. available to the court to limit the harm or extent of 
the harm that is likely to be caused if the evidence of the protected confidence or protected 
identity information is disclose; (g) if the proceeding is a criminal proceeding whether the 
party seeking to adduce the evidence of the protected confidence or protected identity 
information is a defendant or prosecutor; (h) whether the substance of the protected 
confidence or the protected identity information has already been disclosed by the protected 
confider or any other person." 
173 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence law: Privilege (NZLC PP23 , Wellington, 
1994) 139- I 40. 
174 New Zealand Law Commission, above, 140. 
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There has been very little litigation involving this section, and none 
in respect of journalists' confidential information. There has also been no 
case involving a claim for protection under section 14 of the Bill of Rights 
Act 1990, 175 despite this potentially providing scope for a rights-based 
argument. 176 
4 Canada 
In contrast to New Zealand and Australia, the courts in Canada have 
recognised that a form of privilege may arise from the application of the 
right to freedom of expression as contained in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. 177 In R v Hughes, the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia held that "the special position of the media, including the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, should be balanced against 
a litigant's right to receive the disclosure of information, including 
confidential sources, by members of the media." 178 In the context of this 
case, where the subpoena was sought by the accused, the right of the 
accused to "make full answer and defence" was a legitimate concern for the 
court to consider in determining the correct balance. 179 The judge set out a 
list of further factors that required consideration in the balancing exercise: 180 
(a) [T]he relevance and materiality of the evidence to the issues at 
trial; ... (c) the probative value of the evidence; (d) whether the evidence is 
available through any other means and if so, whether reasonable efforts 
have been made on the part of the accused to obtain the evidence from 
175 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, s 14 provides: "Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impa1t information and 
opinions of any kind in any form." 
176 New Zealand Law Commission, above, 134. 
177 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), sch B). Section 2(b) provides that everyone has the right to "freedom of 
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication." 
178 R v Hughes (A) et al (14 July 1998) British Columbia Supreme Court Vancouver 
CC97 I I 80, para 54 Rom illy J. Although the court considered this exercise within the 
context of the Charter, the judge stated that " this principle is not dependant upon the 
Charter and in fact predates the Charter." R v Hughes, above, para 55. 
179 
R v Hughes, above, para 60. In fact, the necessity of the evidence to the accused's case 
and his right to make full answer and defence was considered to be "perhaps the most 
important factor" since it touches on a constitutional right. R v Hughes, above, para 69. 
180 
R v Hughes, above, para 66. These factors were subsequently applied in R v Erickson 
[2002] OJ No 3341. 
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that other source; (e) if the media's ability to gather and report the news 
will be impaired by being called to give evidence and if so, the degree to 
which it is impaired; (1) whether the necessity of the evidence in the case 
at hand outweighs the impairment, if any, of the role of the media; and 
(g) whether the impairment of the media ' s function can be minimised by 
confining the evidence adduced to only that which is necessary to the 
accused ' s case and his right to make full answer and defence. 
Having found that the impact on freedom of expression in this case 
did not outweigh the accused ' s right to defend the charges against him, 181 in 
part because the information was not confidential and thus the impact was 
considered to be reduced, 182 the judge then went on to consider the 
application of Wigmore' s four conditions for the recognition of a privilege. 
Even assuming that the first three elements were satisfied, the judge applied 
his earlier reasoning in holding that a claim for qualified privilege was not 
made out. 183 This was because it could not be shown that the harm to the 
relationship between journalist and source was greater than the benefits of 
disclosure to the administration of justice in this case. 184 
D How Does the Appeals Chamber Test Compare? 
It is clear from the domestic approaches that there is no absolute 
testimonial privilege for journalists, 185 regardless of whether the source of 
the rule is statutory or constitutional protection, or results from the 
application of Wigmore' s criteria. In all instances the underlying 
justification for the recognition of a privilege is the desire to protect the 
public interest in the free flow of information. The focus is on balancing this 
interest in some way with the interests inherent in the administration of 
181 R v Hughes, above, paras 82-103 . 
182 R v Hughes, above, para 101 (holding that " if there is an infringement on the freedom of 
the press in this case that infringement is not a substantial one.") Note that the fact that the 
information was non-confidential did not necessarily preclude the existence of a journalistic 
privilege. 
183 R v Hughes, above, paras 105-107. The judge found that the first two were difficult to 
make out in this case due to the non-confidential nature of the relationship, but accepted 
that the third, regarding the importance of the relationship, applied. 
184 R v Hughes, above, para I 08. 
185 But see some state shield laws in the United States, including those in California and 
Nevada, and Austrian statutory law, which recognise an absolute privilege for journalists. 
New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23 , Wellington, 1994). 
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justice. Indeed, the limited and incoherent nature of the New Zealand and 
Australian approaches might be explained by the absence of strong 
constitutional protection of the right to freedom of expression in comparison 
to the three other jurisdictions examined, and therefore the balance will 
favour disclosure in most cases. 
In terms of the possible applications of general principles of law set 
out above, the public interest in protecting freedom of expression, which is 
the basis for the qualified journalistic privilege recognised by the Appeals 
Chamber, therefore reflects "the reasoning underpinning" the rules m 
domestic courts. 186 Furthermore, regardless of the approach used m 
formulating these rules, domestic courts engage in a balancing exercise. 
Two identifiable factors in this exercise are the importance of the 
information sought, and the need to consider other sources before requiring 
the testimony of journalists. Particular rules that incorporate these may 
therefore be seen as "reflective of a more general rule." These factors also 
allow for the identification of when there will be a "pressing social need" 
for the restriction on freedom of expression, as required by a reading of 
international human rights documents such as the European Convention. 187 
That a balancing of competing interests is inherent in the creation of 
evidentiary privileges might also be seen as a rule that has "crystallised into 
a general rule." As was argued by the amici, the fact that many of the 
domestic cases deal with different factual scenarios "does not diminish the 
force of their message - the importance of the continual dissemination of 
information and the need to carefully balance the interests involved." 188 
186 Although only a limited number of jurisdictions have been considered in this paper this 
does not in itself go against the finding the general principles of law exist in relation to 
journalistic privilege. Jn fact, "general principles of law can be adduced from a single 
system." Natasha A Affolder "Tadic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of 
International Procedural Law" (1998) 19 Mich J Intl L 445, 493 . 
187 See Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 ( 11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 32 Judge Shahabuddeen 
(stating that "[i]fthe evidence was reasonable available from other sources, this suggests 
that there was no pressing social need for the restriction of the exercise of freedom of 
expression resulting from compulsion to testify."). 
188 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (I 7 August 2002) " Brief Amici 
Curiae on Behalf of Various Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal's Appeal of 
Trial Chamber' s ' Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give 
Evidence '", para 52. 
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With regard to the scope and content of these rules, there are 
different opinions in domestic jurisdictions with respect to extending the 
journalists' privilege to include non-confidential information. A stronger 
case can be made if a constitutional, or rights-based, approach is used, as 
there is the potential to argue that freedom of expression is affected by 
forced disclosure regardless of the type of information sought. In contrast, 
the traditional law of privilege and resulting statutes focus on the nature of 
the relationship involved as indicating when the free flow of information 
might be affected by the disclosure of information. 
Although many United States courts have applied a lower threshold 
for upholding subpoenas where non-confidential information is involved, 
most do not explain the reason for this. As one commentator has questioned, 
"[i]f the same First Amendment interests are implicated when both 
confidential and non-confidential information is subpoenaed, then why does 
the same test not apply?" 189 In this respect, if it is accepted that the affect on 
freedom of expression is the same, particularly in the case of war 
correspondents, 190 the Appeals Chamber test in Randal 's case can be seen 
as indicating a consistency that is lacking in the approaches of other 
jurisdictions in that it does not differentiate between types of information. 
This consistency is also evident from other features of the Appeals 
Chamber's approach. For example, there is no indication that a different test 
will be applied depending on the subpoenaing party. 191 Furthermore, that the 
appropriate balance and burden of proof is implicit in the test, rather than 
through the setting out of various factors that a court may consider on a 
case-by-case basis, achieves a level of clarity and predictability that is not 
evident in many domestic approaches. With regard to the Trial Chan1ber's 
proposal for a flexible balancing approach, the amici argued that the 
resulting unpredictability "would exacerbate the problems inherent in 
compelling journalists to testify by making journalists and potential news 
189 Anthony L Fargo "Reconsidering the Federal Journalist's Privilege for Non-Confidential 
Information: Gonzales v NBC (2001) 19 Cardozo Arts and Ent L J 355, 386-387. 
190 See Part V C 3 The impact of compelling testimony. 
191 See Part V B Fair Trial Rights. 
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sources unsure of how difficult it would be in any given case to compel 
journalists to testify before the Tribunal." 192 Commentators have 
emphasised the need for predictable standards in the international tribunals, 
considering that "lack of predictability was a most troubling problem in the 
World War II tribunals." 193 
The Appeals Chamber approach is therefore not only an obvious 
representation of the general principles of law concerning journalistic 
privilege, it also advances the goal of creating a comprehensive legal 
framework containing identifiable and clear rules that permit consistent 
application. 
The Appeals Chamber in Randal 's case recognised the need to 
balance the competing interests involved, and sought to formulate a test that 
would take into account the substance of these interests in the context of 
international criminal law. The following Part examines these interests, and 
the need for the international tribunals to have regard to them in their work, 
in order to determine whether the Appeals Chamber test achieves a fair and 
workable balance between them in terms of the threshold that it establishes 
for overcoming the privilege. That is, whether there has been a "fair 
determination" of the issue in accordance with Rule 89(B). 
V BALANCING THE COMPETING INTERESTS 
A The Role and Purpose of the International Tribunals 
As set out above, 194 the international tribunals must have regard to 
the wording and ' spirit' of their Statutes in resolving procedural issues. As 
there is nothing in the wording of the Statutes to deny the tribunals the 
192 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (I 7 August 2002) " Brief Amici 
Curiae on Behalfof Various Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal's Appeal of 
Trial Chamber' s ' Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give 
Evidence "', para 38 . 
193 
Evan J Wallach "The Procedural And Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War 
Crimes Trials: Did They Provide An Outline For International Legal Procedure?" (1999) 37 
Colum J Transnatl L 851 , 882 . 
194 
Part Ill A The Ability to Formulate Rules and the Applicable Sources of Law. 
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authority to recognise a privilege, it is therefore necessary to consider the 
underlying purposes of the tribunals and their work. 
The ICTY has found that its purpose is to "do justice, to deter further 
crimes, and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace." 195 
Expanding on this, more general justifications for establishing international 
tribunals include: 196 
• creating an accurate historical record of the events; 
• advancing international jurisprudence and the international rule of 
law; 
• identifying guilty individuals to preclude demonisation of entire 
nations or groups (individualising guilt) ; and 
• achieving justice in the eyes of victims, defendants, and the world 
community. 
It may be considered that the adjudication of criminal allegations 
with the greatest degree of accuracy possible is of primary importance. 197 
This is because without factually accurate findings there is the risk of 
injustice and of doubt regarding findings of guilt, which in turn threatens the 
legitimacy of the international order and affects the possibility of lasting 
peace. Obtaining relevant and truthful evidence is therefore a key 
underlying factor in the ability of the Tribunals to achieve their goals. 
The importance of this factor was raised in Randal 's case, with the 
prosecution identifying that there was a threat to the Tribunal ' s "core fact-
finding function" arising from the asserted privilege. 198 The Trial Chamber 
195 Prosecutor v Tadic Case No IT-94-1 (I O August 1995, Trial Chamber) " Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses", para 18. 
By 1993, events in the former Yugoslavia led the United Nations Security Council to 
declare that the atrocities that were occurring constituted a " threat to international peace," 
and that the creation of an international criminal tribunal would "contribute to the 
restoration of peace." Security Council Resolution 808 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/Res/808. 
These two findings are necessary prerequisites to the United Nations undertaking actions 
under Chapter VI I of its Charter. See United Nations Charter (26 June 1945) 59 Stat I 031 , 
arts 39, 41, 42. 
196 Gregory A McClelland "A Non-Adversary Approach To International Criminal 
Tribunals" (2002) 26 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev I, 2. 
197 McClelland, above, 5. 
198 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber II) 
" Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para 22. 
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considered that the role of journalists in international justice was important 
primarily because of their ability to provide evidence, 199 and therefore 
appeared to suggest that the balance will most often fall on the side of 
compelling testimony in the pursuit of justice. There are, however, other 
interests at play in the purpose and work of the international tribunals. Thus 
Judge Shahabuddeen considered that: 200 
When the Security Council vested judicial power in the Tribunal, that 
power included power (with a corresponding duty) to act fairly, as a 
judicial body would, towards all who had business before the Chambers. 
A subpoenaed war correspondent would be one such person. 
This statement can also be seen as relating to the importance of 
protecting the accused ' s right to a fair trial. Such protection is necessary to 
prevent the conviction of innocent persons, and is therefore a key aspect in 
ensuring that decisions, and the tribunals themselves, are viewed as 
legitimate. In an adversarial system the recognition of the rights of the 
accused may come into conflict with the interests of the prosecutor, as the 
representative of victims and the international community generally, in 
securing convictions. In terms of the broader purposes of the tribunals, 
however, the protection of fair trial rights can be seen as vitally important to 
ensunng that decisions result from a consideration of the information 
obtained from both sides.201 The accused must therefore be entitled to 
prepare and present a defence to the charges. Thus the recognition of a 
privilege not only affects the prosecution's ability to obtain inculpatory 
evidence, but also implicates the fair trial rights of the accused. 202 A "central 
199 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 25 (emphasising that "the vital 
importance of the role of the journalist" results from " its obvious uti I ity in effectively 
serving to bring to justice those responsible for the crimes the journalists report upon."). 
200 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) " Decision on lnterlocutory Appeal", para 5 Judge Shahabuddeen. 
20 1 See Christian DeFrancia "Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure 
Matters" (2001) 87 Va L Rev 1381 , 1414. 
202 This particular aspect was not dealt with separately by either the Trial or the Appeals 
Chamber in Randa/ 's case, despite it being raised by the prosecution. This may have been 
because the case was concerned with a prosecution motion, and because the defence did not 
appear in before the Chambers in relation to the issue, or it may have been because the 
Chambers considered this issue as being part of the general need for reliable evidence, 
whether it go towards proof of innocence or of guilt. 
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and crucial question" is the extent to which international tribunals must 
consider international human rights law in formulating such a rule. 203 
B Fair Trial Rights 
The right to a fair trial is a basic human right and a "prominent part 
of international and regional human rights and humanitarian instruments."204 
The specific right implicated by the recognition of a testimonial privilege is 
the right of the accused "to examine, or have examined, the witnesses 
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on 
his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him."205 
As noted above, the Appeals Chamber in Randal 's case did not 
indicate any differential treatment depending on the identity of the 
subpoenaing party. That both the prosecution and the defence should be 
treated equally and fairly has been recognised by the tribunals in their 
application of the principle of ' equality of arms, ' which has been held to be 
an inherent aspect of the Statutes and Rules governing their work. 206 Thus 
the prosecution must not be put at any disadvantage that would an1ount to a 
203 Goran Sluiter " International Criminal Proceedings and the Protection of Human Rights" 
(2003) 37 New Eng L Rev 935 , 936. 
204 Sara Stapleton "Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory 
Interpretation and the Impermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 31 NYU J Intl L Poly 535, 
560. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) GA Res 217, UN 
Doc A/810, arts 9- I I ; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (I 9 December 
1966) 999 UNTS 171 , arts 9, I 4-15 ; The African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights 
(27 June 1981) 21 ILM 59, arts 3, 6-7; European Convention on Human Rights (4 
November 1950) 312 UNTS 221, arts 5-7; American Convention on Human Rights (22 
November 1969) 9 ILM 673 , arts 7-9. 
205 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above, art 14(3)(e). Similar 
wording is also used in the American Convention on Human Rights, above, art 8(2)(t); 
European Convention on Human Rights, above, art 6(3)(d). See also First Protocol to the 
Geneva Convention on the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts ( 1966) UN Doc 
A/32/1 44. For general background and discussion of this right see Frank R Herrmann and 
M Speer Brownlow " Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the 
Confrontation Clause" (1994) 34 Va J Intl L 481. 
206 See Prosecutor v Tadic Case No IT-94-1 ( 15 July 1999, Appeals Chamber) "Judgment" , 
para 52 (finding that the principle of equality of arms "means that the Prosecution and the 
Defence must be equal before the Trial Chamber.' ')" Prosecutor v Dela/ic Case No IT-96-
21-T (4 February 1998, Trial Chamber) " Decision on the Prosecution ' s Motion for an 
Order Requiring Advance Disclosure of Witnesses by the Defence"; Prosecutor v 
Aleksovski Case No. IT-95-14/1 ( I 6 February 1999, Appeals Chamber) "Decision on 
Prosecutor' s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence.'' In particular, such a finding was made 
on the basis of article 21 (I) of the ICTY Statute, which provides that " [a]II persons shall be 
equal before the International Tribunal .'' 
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procedural inequality in favour of the defence,207 and consequently the 
Appeals Chamber test must be applied to defence requests for subpoenas of 
war correspondents, thereby potentially affecting their ability to present a 
defence if the presumption is not overcome. 
This would not on its face violate the terms of the accused's right set 
out above, since the same conditions apply to the prosecution. The right is 
further implicated, however, as a result of the tribunals' liberal approach to 
the admission of evidence. This is because the evidence that is sourced from 
a journalist (such as Randal ' s article) may be admitted and considered by 
the court in its final judgment, despite the defendant not having the 
opportunity to cross-examine the journalist.208 In the context of Randal 's 
case, the defence offered two justifications for seeking the appearance of 
Randal before the Tribunal: "The first is that his testimony would enable the 
Defence to challenge the accuracy of the statements attributed to Brdjanin in 
the Article. The second is that [Randal] may place Brdjanin's statements in 
a context that will cast them in a more favourable light for the Defence."209 
Therefore, as submitted by the prosecution, the accused's right to cross-
examine witnesses was directly at issue.210 
1 International instruments and minimum standards 
Although it is included as "minimum guarantee" in a number of 
human rights instruments,211 there is little consensus as to whether the right 
to examine witnesses in fact constitutes a fundamental procedural nom1 that 
207 Prosecutor v Delalic, above, para 49. 
208 In fact, this was the finding of both the Appeals and the Trial Chamber with regard to 
the admission of Randal ' s article. See Prosecutor v Brdjanin Case No IT-99-36-T (30 June 
2003, Trial Chamber 11) " Decision on Prosecution's Second Request for a Subpoena of 
Jonathan Randal", paras 41-42 (finding that "the Defence challenge to the accuracy of the 
statements ascribed to the Accused, will , inter alia, be taken into consideration in deciding 
what weight to ascribe to the Article."). 
209 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 54. 
2 10 
Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber II) 
" Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para 22. 
211 
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 19 December 1966) 999 
UNTS 171 , art 14(3); European Convention on Human Rights ( 4 November 1950) 312 
UNTS 221, art 6(3); American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) 9 ILM 
673 , art 8(2). 
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cannot be derogated from in any circumstances.212 The European Court of 
Human JQghts has suggested that proceedings should be considered as a 
whole in determining whether the accused's right to a fair trial has been 
violated,213 and that there may be situations when the court is required to 
balance the right to examine witnesses with other interests.214 That is, it may 
not be an automatic breach of fair trial rights to refuse to allow the defence 
the opportunity to directly cross-examine witnesses, but some way of 
questioning or challenging a witness should be provided in order for a trial 
to be fair. 215 
Furthermore, fair trial rights are not included as non-derogable rights 
in the international documents, many of which have a general derogation 
clause that applies to all rights except the rights to life, to be free from 
torture and cruel or inhuman punishment, and freedom from slavery.216 
212 For example, "Theodor Meron includes this right among his list of customary procedural 
norms, but it is excluded in Mani's list of fundamental procedural norms." Natasha A 
Affolder "Tadic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources oflnternational Procedural Law" 
(1998) 19 M ich J Intl L 445, footnote 240 (referring to Theodor Meron Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Norms as Customary law (Oxford, I 989) 96-96; V S Mani International 
Adjudication: Procedure Aspects (Martin us N ijhoff, The Hague, 1980) 12). 
2 13 See Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330, para 72 (holding that no violation 
of the Convention can be found " if it is established that the handicaps under which the 
defence laboured were sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the 
judicial authorities."). This was the finding in Kostovski v The Netherlands (1989) 12 
EHRR 434, para 43. See also Doorson, above, para 78 (considering that the task of the 
European Court is to "ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way 
evidence was taken, were fair."). 
2 14 Doorson v The Netherlands, above, para 74 (finding that "while it would clearly have 
been preferable for the applicant to have attended the questioning of the witnesses," on 
balance the domestic court was "entitled to consider that the interests of the applicant were 
outweighed in this respect by the need to ensure the safety of witnesses.") 
215 See generally Doorson v The Netherlands, above. 
216 lnternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1996) 999 UNTS 
I 71, art 4 provides that " [i]n times of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do 
not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or 
social origin." See also European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 1950) 312 
UNTS 221, art 15; American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1959) 9 ILM 
673 , art 27 (but see art 27(2) which enumerate non-derogable rights, including judicial 
guarantees essential to the protection of those rights.) For general discussion of derogation 
clauses see Sara Stapleton "Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: 
Statutory Interpretation and the lmpermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 31 NYU J Intl L 
Poly 535, 582-600. 
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Some commentators have argued, however, that such prov1s10ns 
were not drafted with international criminal courts in mind,217 and that these 
bodies must vigorously uphold fair trial rights.218 This is because protection 
of the accused's rights is a key factor affecting how the international 
community will judge the tribunals.219 In fact, the first Chief Prosecutor for 
the ad hoe tribunals, Richard Goldstone, commented that "[ w ]hether there 
are convictions or whether there are acquittals will not be a yardstick [ of the 
ICTY]. The measure is going to be the fairness of the proceedings."220 
Furthermore, commentators argue that it would be unthinkable for the 
international tribunals to be held to a lesser standard than domestic courts, 
particularly due to their ability to act as a role model in this regard. 221 
In comparison to domestic courts, however, there are "additional, 
sometimes countervailing, considerations that make the concept of fair trails 
particularly complex for international criminal courts. "222 
2 17 Sara Stapleton " Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory 
Interpretation and the lmpermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 31 NYU J Intl L Poly 535, 
602. See also Natasha A Affolder "Tactic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of 
International Procedural Law" (I 998) 19 Mich J Intl L 445 , 478 (stating that " [n]o 
provision exists in the Statute on the possibility of derogation from the rights included in 
it."). 
2 18 Stapleton, above, 545 (arguing that " there is a minimum level of procedural rights below 
which the ICC cannot go, regardless of the practical impact of the guarantees."). 
2 19 See Joseph L Falvey Jr "United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the 
Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (I 995) Fordham Intl L J 475 , 485 ; Rod Dixon 
"Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals" 
( 1997) Transnatl Land Contemp Prob 81 , 82 ; Christian DeFrancia " Due Process in 
International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters" (2001) 87 Va L Rev 1381, 1383; 
Lynne Miriam Baum "Pursuing Justice in a Climate of Moral Outrage: An Evaluation of 
the Rights of the Accused in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" (200 I) 
19 Wis Intl LJ 197, 197; Vincent M Creta "The Search for Justice in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analysing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia" ( 1998) 20 Hous J lntl L 381 , 383 . Indeed, an aspect of the reluctance of the 
United States to ratify the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court is the 
view that citizens would not receive a fair trial in proceedings before the court. See Patricia 
M Wald "To ' Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence' : The Use of Affidavit 
Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings" (200 I) 42 Harv Intl L J 535, 
552. 
220 Quoted in Jacob Katz Cogan "International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties 
and Prospects" (2002) Yale J Intl L 111 , 114. 
22 1 Cogan, above, 117-118; Sara Stapleton " Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International 
Criminal Court: Statutory Interpretation and the lmpermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 31 
NYU J Intl Land Poly 535, 546. This is also a factor ifone of the purposes of the 
international criminal tribunals is to strengthen the international rule of law. See Part V A 
The Role and Purpose of the International Tribunals. 
222 Cogan, above, 114. 
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2 The challenge of protecting fair trial rights in the international 
tribunals 
Apart from the express desire to protect victims and witnesses, 
additional complicating factors include the heightened accountability of 
international tribunals with regard to achieving convictions for crimes of an 
extreme character, and the strong interests of states in maintaining their 
powers and prerogatives.223 Furthermore, the inherent difficulties in 
prosecuting these types of crime, which have elements in terms of scale and 
extent that are far removed from domestic crimes, might call for 
"extraordinary trial procedures."224 
A key issue with regard to protecting fair trial rights is whether the 
courts have the necessary capacity, in terms of independence and coercive 
powers, to achieve such a goal. Some commentators have argued that the 
co-operation regime with States that is established by the Statutes has failed 
to ensure equality between the prosecution and the defence in their ability to 
procure evidence and witnesses, and therefore present a reasonable case. 225 
This is because evidence that is necessary to prove innocence or assert a 
legal defence "may be beyond the reach of the court, either because of the 
court's inability to successfully coerce the evidence-holder or because the 
evidence-holder deliberately seeks to influence the outcome of the trial by 
manipulating the release of probative information."226 Such occurrences are 
223 Cogan, above, 114. 
224 Cogan, above, 115. 
225 Cogan, above, 121 ; Gregory A McClelland "A Non-Adversary Approach To 
International Criminal Tribunals" (2002) 26 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev I, 35 ; Sara Stapleton 
"Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory Interpretation and the 
lmpermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 31 NYU J Intl Land Poly 535, 557. The ' co-
operation regime ' imposes binding obligations on States, as a result of the Statute being 
contained in a Security Council resolution , to assist the court when specifically requested. 
This is set out in article 29 of the ICTY Statute which requires States to "co-operate with 
the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of 
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law." There are loopholes in 
the Rules, however, which allow for withholding of national security information (Rule 
54bis), and other confidential state information (Rule 70). 
226 Stapleton, above, 257. According to the counsel for Tactic, " the lack of cooperation 
displayed by the authorities in the Republika Srpska had a disproportionate impact on the 
Defence ... [And accordingly] there was no ' equality of arms' between the Prosecution and 
the Defence at Trial. . . [T]he effect of this lack of cooperation was serious enough to 
frustrate [Tactic's] right to a fair trial." Cogan, above, 124. The same problems exist in 
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seen as having a disproportionate effect on the defence since they lack the 
power, the resources, and the sympathies of governments that the prosecutor 
has on their side.227 Indeed, it may be said that in many cases heard by the 
tribunals the need for effective cross-examination becomes particularly 
important since the "only viable defence may be attacking the credibility 
and motives of witnesses."228 
Therefore, although the impact of a privilege on the accused's ability 
to obtain the attendance of war correspondents may not be a technical 
breach of their fair trial rights, it could be argued that there is the potential 
for it to amount to a substantive derogation if the test is framed in a way that 
unfairly restricts a defence. 
3 Rules and decisions of the tribunals 
The Statutes of the tribunals clearly recognise the need to protect the 
rights of the accused. 229 Article 21 ( 4 )( e) guarantees the right to examine 
witnesses using the san1e wording as a number of human rights 
instrwnents.230 Therefore, in terms of the applicable law for the 
interpretation of this provision, international documents would appear to be 
of considerable value. That this is the case is highlighted by the legislative 
intent in drafting the Statutes as seen in the Report of the Secretary-General 
regarding the establishment of the ICTY:231 
Rwanda, where defence counsel have complained for some time about unequal access to, 
and improper government tampering with , witnesses. See Cogan, above, 129. 
227 Cogan, above, 131 ; Gregory A McClelland "A Non-Adversary Approach To 
International Criminal Tribunals" (2002) 26 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev I, 35. This is also the 
case in domestic settings, although perhaps to a lesser degree than in the international 
tribunals. However, Antonio Cassesse, President of the Tribunal, has "urgently pointed out 
on several occasions that the scarce resources available to his tribunal make it almost 
impossible to operate effectively and implement investigations." Quoted in Mercedeh 
Momeni " Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect 
Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1997) 41 How L J 155, 173. 
228 Sara Stapleton " Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory 
Interpretation and the lmpermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 3 I NYU J Intl L Poly 535, 
561. 
229 ICTY Statute, art 21; lCTR Statute, art 20. 
230 See Part V B Fair Trial Rights. 
23 1 " Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 ( 1993)" (3 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, para I 06. See Natasha A Affolder 
"Tactic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International Procedural Law" (1998) 
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It is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect 
internationally recognised standards regarding the rights of the accused at 
all stages of its proceedings. In the view of the Secretary-General , such 
internationally standards are, in particular, contained in article I 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
It is important to note that while there are basic ideas of what 
constitutes a fair trial, and certainly the international documents reflect 
these, "ideas of due process vary within different contexts."232 Part of the 
'unique legal framework' of the international tribunals has been the 
development of standards and approaches with regard to fair trial rights. It 
can be argued that other international or regional bodies do not engage in 
the prosecution of individuals, but rather are concerned with assigning 
responsibility to the State, and therefore the international criminal tribunals 
are embarking on a "maiden voyage" with respect to procedural norms.233 
The most extensive discussion regarding the application of 
international standards in interpreting the right to examine witnesses 
occurred as a result of the ICTY's Protective Measures decision in the Tadic 
case. 234 The judges examined the provisions of international human rights 
documents and their application by other courts, particularly in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and the majority 
concluded that "the rights of an accused guaranteed under the principle of 
the right to a fair trial are not wholly without qualification."235 It went on to 
consider that, in the context of the tribunals, "the protection of victims and 
witnesses is an acceptable reason to limit the accused's right to a fair 
19 Mich J Intl L 445 , 477 (considering that " [t]he Secretary General ' s Report containing 
the Statute and commentary can be regarded as an authoritative source of law for the 
interpretation of the Statute." ); Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94- l-AR72 (2 October 
1995, Appeals Chamber) "Appeal on Jurisdiction" (finding the Report to be "part of the 
preparatory works of the Statute and the International Tribunal."). 
23 2 Christian DeFrancia "Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure 
Matters" (2001) 87 Va L Rev 1381 , 1384 (giving the examples of prisoners of war, 
conditions of public emergency, and "differing prerogatives of domestic jurisdictions"). 
233 Rod Dixon "Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals" (1997) Transnatl Land Contemp Prob 81 , 84. 
234 Prosecutor v Tadic Case No IT-94-1 ( I O August 1995, Trial Chamber) " Decision on the 
Prosecutor' s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses" . 
235 Prosecutor v Tadic, above, para 61. 
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trial,"236 and that the affect that particular measures have on the right to 
examme witnesses did not on its own violate the broader right to a fair 
trial. 237 
The right to examine witnesses is therefore not considered by the 
Tribunal to be absolute. This is further demonstrated by amendments to the 
Rules that make it easier to admit affidavit evidence in the absence of cross-
examination,238 and by decisions to admit transcripts of witness testimony 
from earlier trials without requiring the witness to appear before the court a 
second time.239 As occurs with the recognition of an evidentiary privilege, 
the Chambers have sought to balance the right with the other interests 
involved in the effective administration of justice, and other community 
interests.240 In a number of decisions, however, the judges have stressed that 
the rights of the accused are a paramount consideration in this exercise,241 
and that international standards are authoritative in this regard.242 
236 Prosecutor v Tadic, above, para 36. See also Prosecutor v Delalic Case No IT-96-21-T 
(28 April 1997, Trial Chamber) "Decision on the Motions by the Prosecution for Protective 
Measures for the Prosecution Witnesses Pseudonymed ' B' Through to 'M"', para 37 
(stating that a concern for witness security is "an acceptable reason to limit the accused's 
right to a public trial."). 
237 Prosecutor v Tadic, above, para 28 . See also Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No 
IT-99-36 (3 July 2000, Trial Chamber II) "Decision on Motion by Prosecution for 
Protective Measures", para 31. 
238 See generally Patricia M Wald "To ' Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence ' : 
The Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings" (2001) 
42 Harv lntl L J 535. 
239 See Prosecutor v Aleksovski Case No IT-95-14/1-AR73 ( 16 February 1999, Appeals 
Chamber) "Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence" ; Prosecutor v 
Naletilic and Martinovic Case No IT-98-34-PT (27 November 2000, Trial Chamber) 
"Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Transcripts and Exhibits Tendered 
During Testimony of Certain Blaskic and Kordic Witnesses" . 
240 See Sara Stapleton " Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory 
Interpretation and the Impermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 31 NYU J Intl Land Poly 
535, 549 (stating that, in the Tadic Protective Measures decision, the Tribunal's attempt "to 
reconcile sometimes incompatible needs for justice, for protection of victims and witnesses, 
for a public declaration that the atrocities committed during the conflict were inhumane, 
and possible, the need for any conviction to convince the international community that the 
court could be ' effective ' contributed to the ICTY ' s decision to ' balance ' the accused ' s 
right to a fair trial."). See also Prosecutor v Nicolic Case No IT-94-2-AR73 (5 June 2003 , 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest", para 
30 (noting that "[t]he correct balance must ... be maintained between the fundamental rights 
of the accused and the essential interests of the international community in the prosecution 
of persons charged with serious violations of international humanitarian law."). 
24 1 
See, for example, Prosecutor v Kordic and Cerkez Case No IT-95-14/2-AR 73.6 (18 
September 2000, Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Appeal Regarding the Admission of 
Seven Affidavits and One Formal Statement." 
242 
See Prosecutor v Tadic Case No IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995, Appeals Chamber) 
"Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction", para 45 (stating 
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Nonetheless, as with domestic law and general principles, the 
jurisprudence developed under regional human rights treaties are not 
considered binding on the tribunals.243 The tribunals can therefore ensure 
that trials are fair with reference to their special circumstances. 
Where the right to obtain and examine witnesses is affected to any 
degree in the course of the proceedings, the Trial Chamber will take this 
into consideration in determining the weight to be accorded to particular 
evidence and,244 more generally, in considering whether the accused has 
been afforded a fair trial. 245 Thus there is the potential for fair trial rights to 
be influential at all stages of the proceedings, with the judges having direct 
responsibility in this regard. The duty to duty to weigh evidence could 
therefore act as an additional "safeguard for the rights of the defendants." 246 
Fair trial rights may not be the only human rights that the tribunals 
will be required to consider in the course of their work. This was recognised 
in Randal 's case when the Trial Chamber stated that it was:247 
[F]ully conscious of its important role in affirming and strengthening 
international human rights: not only those fundamental rights very often 
violated in the cases that have come and will continue to come before this 
Tribunal, not only the substantive and procedural rights of the accused, 
not only the rights of victims, but also all those other fundamental rights 
and freedoms that in the course of its work it is called upon to protect, 
including freedom of expression. 
that the Tribunal " must provide al I the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, 
in full conformity with internationally recognised human rights instruments"); Prosecutor v 
Barayawi=a Case No ICTR-96-19 (3 November 1999, Appeals Chamber) " Decision", para 
40 (stating that the ICCPR " is part of the general international law and is applied on that 
basis.") 
243 See Prosecutor v Barayawi=a (3 November 1999, Appeals Chamber) " Decision", para 
40 (holding that the jurisprudence of regional human rights bodies "are persuasive 
authorities which may be of assistance in applying and interpreting the Tribunal's 
applicable law. Thus, they are not binding of their own accord on the Tribunal. They are, 
however, authoritative as evidence of international custom."). 
244 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89(0). 
245 See Prosecutor v Tadic Case No IT-94-1 (15 July 1999, Appeals Chamber) "Judgment" 
(in which the defence's first ground of appeal was that there had been an inequality of arms 
leading to the denial of a fair trial). 
246 Richard May and Marieke Wierda "Trends in International Criminal Evidence: 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha" ( 1999) Col J Transnatl L 725, 755-756. 
247 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber II) 
" Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para 30. 
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The Trial Chamber went on to acknowledge "that although it is not 
bound by the laws and judicial pronouncements of any State, it has a duty to 
keep itself abreast with the developments in the field of international human 
rights."248 A feature of human rights is that they will inevitably come into 
conflict with each other, and with other community interests, in certain 
circumstances. In the case of war correspondents, the public interest in their 
work is simultaneously integrated in both the right to freedom of expression 
and the interests of justice. This is because the information that they obtain 
regarding acts committed during conflicts can give rise to pressure for the 
establishment of international tribunals to prosecute those responsible, and 
can even result in individual indictments due to investigators being made 
aware of events and evidence. 
C Freedom of Expression 
I International human rights and the role of the media 
As with fair trial rights, the right to freedom of express10n 1s 
provided in a number of international and regional human rights 
instruments.249 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
reflects the general wording and substance of these provisions. It states: 
"Everyone has the right to freedom of expression; this right includes the 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers. "250 
In support of its view that there is considerable public interest in the 
work of war correspondents, the Appeals Chamber in Randal 's case 
emphasised that the right to freedom of expression includes the right to 
248 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 30. 
249 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 
171 , art 19; American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) 9 ILM 673 , art 
13 ; European Convention on Human Rights ( 4 November 1950) 312 UNTS 221, art I 0(1 ); 
African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights (27 June 1981) 21 lLM 59, art 9 . 
250 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights ( I O December 1948) GA Res 217, UN Doc 
A/810, art 19. 
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receive information.251 Thus it was concerned not only with the rights of 
journalists themselves, but more generally in those of the international 
public. In this respect, the Inter-American Court of Human rights has stated 
that "when an individual' s freedom of expression is unlawfully restricted, it 
is not only the right of that individual that is being violated, but also the 
right of all others to 'receive' information and ideas."252 The role of the 
mass media is therefore particularly important, with the Court considering 
that "journalism is the primary and principal manifestation of freedom of 
expression. "253 
The European Court of Human Rights has also strongly emphasised 
the importance of the media's role in being able to report freely on matters 
of public interest.254 In Goodwin, the Court considered that the press has a 
"vital public watchdog" role,255 and recalled that "freedom of expression 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and the 
safeguards to be afforded to the press are of particular importance,"256 
In the context of international law and human rights generally, an 
organ of the United Nations has produced a Declaration regarding the role 
of the mass media.257 Article II states that "[t]he exercise of freedom of 
op1mon, express10n and information, recognised as an integral part of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a vital factor in the 
strengthening of peace and international understanding."258 It is therefore 
25 1 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 37. 
252 Compu/so,y Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of 
Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory 
Opinion OC-5/85 (I 3 November 1985) Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) No 5, para 30. 
253Compulso,y Membership in an Association Prescribed by law for the Practice of 
Journalism, above, para 71. 
254 See Handyside v United Kingdom (I 980) I EHRR 737; The Sunday Times v United 
Kingdom (1980) 2 EHRR 245. 
255 Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, para 70. 
256 Goodwin v United Kingdom, above, para 39. 
257 Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution to the Mass Media 
to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights 
and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War (22 November 1978) 
UNESCO Doc 20C/20 Rev (UNESCO Declaration). 
258 UNESCO Declaration, art 11.1 . See also art 11.3 : "With a view to the strengthening of 
peace and international understanding, to promoting human rights and to countering 
racialism, apartheid and incitement to war, the mass media throughout the world, by reason 
of their role, contribute to promoting human rights, in particular by giving expression to 
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essential for the international community to "contribute to the creation of 
conditions ... for the protection, in the exercise of their functions, of 
journalists and other agents of the mass media."259 
One commentator has also emphasised the importance of the 
media' s role in international armed conflicts, and strongly advocates the 
I . d . 1· 260 resu tmg nee to protect Journa 1sts: 
Since in situations of armed conflict it is difficult to enforce international 
law, journalists ' coverage of the performance of the armed parties is of 
special significance. In fact, since media information influences political 
attitudes toward armed conflict, what journalists report often contributes 
toward ensuring respect for the relevant norms of conduct. In most 
situations of armed conflict, the responsible parties give widely different 
accounts of the circumstances, and the international community has to 
rely on journalists to provide relatively unbiased accounts. Thus, the 
potential for the contribution of journalism to international peace, though 
indirect, is immense. To the extent that the international community is 
willing and able to protect journalists covering international conflicts, the 
cause of international peace is furthered . 
Thus the public interest in protecting freedom of expression, 
particularly with regard to the work of journalists, is particularly strong at 
the international level. The question that arises is the extent to which this 
should be taken into account by the international tribunals, and whether the 
impact on the role of war correspondents from compelling testimony is 
sufficient to justify special treatment. 
oppressed peoples who struggle against colonialism, neocolonialsim, foreign occupation 
and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and who are unable to make their 
voices heard within their own territories." 
259 UNESCO Declaration, art IX. See also art 11.4: " If the mass media are to be in a position 
to promote the principles of this Declaration in their activities, it is essential that journalists 
and other agents of the mass media, in their own country or abroad, be assured protection 
guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession ;" and art X.1: 
"with due respect for constitutional provisions designed to guarantee freedom of 
information and for the applicable international instruments and agreements, it is 
indispensable to create and maintain throughout the world the conditions which make it 
possible for the organisations and persons professionally involved in the dissemination of 
information to achieve the objectives of this Declaration." 
260 Amit Mukherjee " International Protection of Journalists : Problem, Practice, and 
Prospects" (1994) 11 Ariz Intl Comp Law 339,344. 
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2 Application of the right to the tribunals 
One commentator considers that apart from the possibility that fair 
trial rights might be violated in the course of the tribunals' functioning, 
"[ o ]ther rights might be at stake as well."261 Although there is no mention of 
the right to freedom of expression in either the Statute or the Rules, and fair 
trial rights in Article 21 are not explicitly 'subject to' such a right as they are 
to the desire to protect victims and witnesses, Judge Shahabuddeen 
advocated an extension of the principles of the international human rights 
instruments to the Tribunals in the same way that they arguably do in the 
context of fair trial rights; in particular through a reading of the Secretary-
General's Report. 262 
Even if the right to freedom of expression does not enter the 
framework of the Tribunals in the manner suggested by Judge 
Shahabuddeen, it can be argued that human rights law "binds the tribunals 
in their activities to the extent that it is part of customary international law 
or constitutes general principles of law."263 This is because, as creations of 
international law the international tribunals are subject to that law, and 
should therefore "abide by peremptory norms of international law under all 
circumstances and respect other rules of international law when they have 
not been empowered to deviate from these rules. "264 
The extensive recognition of the right to freedom of expression in 
international documents and domestic law, including most notably as a 
constitutional norm, is strongly indicative of its status as either customary 
international law or as a general principle. However, the fact that the right is 
26 1 Goran Sluiter " International Criminal Proceedings and the Protection of Human Rights" 
(2003) 37 New Eng L Rev 935, 935 (referring to the right to privacy in the context of the 
execution of search warrants, and the right to freedom of expression being restricted by 
newspapers being ordered not to publish the names of protected witnesses). 
262 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73 .9 (Ii December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 8 Judge Shahabuddeen. In a 
footnote, the Judge acknowledged that the Secretary-General was referring to article 14 of 
the JCCPR in para 136 of the report, but he considered that "[i]n the context in which [he) 
was speaking, his reference to the rights of the accused was understandable; it does not 
limit the applicability of the Covenant to other matters." 
263 Sluiter, above, 938. 
264 Sluiter, above, 938. 
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not absolute, and can be derogated from in certain situations involving 
competing interests,265 is a complicating factor in determining the scope and 
content of the right, and the extent to which a particular application of it is a 
part of these principles.266 Furthermore, the situations referred to in the 
international instruments deal with domestic conditions, giving countries 
scope to consider their own particular needs, and were not intended to apply 
in the context of an international tribunal applying international law.267 
Therefore, as suggested by Judge Shahabuddeen, the application of the right 
to freedom of expression in the Tribunals could justifiably be subject to "the 
modifications attributable to its peculiar position,"268 and to "the restrictions 
on the exercise of it which result from the responsibilities and functions of 
the Tribunal. "269 
The reliance of the Trial Chamber on the Goodwin case, and its 
finding that the right to freedom of expression is only affected when 
journalists are forced to disclose confidential information, suggests that 
there are no similar impact resulting from other situations, whether in a 
domestic or an international setting. It may be argued, however, that the 
distinct and special nature of the work of war correspondents, and its 
relationship with the international criminal justice system, give rise to a 
need to consider the right in that context, and the impact of testifying anew. 
265 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 
UNTS 171 , art 19(3) which states that " [t]he exercise of the rights provided for in 
paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore 
be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of 
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals." Very 
similar wording is contained in the American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 
1969) 9 ILM 673 , art 13(2). See also European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 
1950) 312 UNTS 221 , art I 0(2) in Part IV C 2 United Kingdom/Europe. 
266 Goran Sluiter "International Criminal Proceedings and the Protection of Human Rights" 
(2003) 37 New Eng L Rev 935, 938. 
267 Sluiter, above, 938. 
268 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) "Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 6 Judge Shahabuddeen 
269 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 8 Judge Shahabuddeen. 
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3 The impact of compelling testimony 
The principal impact that Randal asserted would result from 
routinely compelling the testimony of war correspondents was that of the 
loss of newsgathering ability, and consequently a reduction in the 
information available to the international community (including 
international criminal tribunals) regarding events of universal concern. 
There are three intertwined factors that Randal and the amici argued would 
contribute to this occurring: the loss of perceived independence, the loss of 
sources and access to information, and the increase in personal danger for 
those reporting from conflict areas. The first two provide the general 
rationale for the recognition of a journalistic privilege in domestic 
settings. 270 
Although the final factor is not a feature of the arguments in other 
jurisdictions, it can be seen as an extension of the more general notion that 
newsgathering is affected by the perception that war correspondents will 
provide evidence to criminal tribunals. A dramatic description of this impact 
is contained in the amicus brief, which quotes a media representative as 
saying that should the tribunals seek the "effective conscription of war 
reporters as the court's agents, observers and therefore its unarmed foot 
soldiers" such a policy would be counter-productive, "since a dead witness 
if of no use to any tribunal." 271 
In the context of international criminal justice, the Appeals Chamber 
similarly recognised that the key feature linking the above factors is that 
routine testimony shifts the role of war correspondents from being neutral 
observers to something more akin to international investigative agents, who 
seek information not only for the public, but directly or indirectly for 
270 See generally Karl H Schmid "Journalist's Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An 
Analysis of United States Courts of Appeals' Decisions from 1973 to 1999" (2002) 39 Am 
Crim L Rev 1441; Anthony L Fargo "The Journalist's Privilege for Non-confidential 
Information in States Without Shield Laws" (2002) 7 Comm L & Poly 241 . 
27 1 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (17 August 2002) " Brief Amici 
Curiae on Behalf of Various Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal's Appeal of 
Trial Chamber's ' Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give 
Evidence"', para 32. 
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governments and other bodies as well.272 This impact is certainly not 
dependent on the nature of the information or testimony sought, whether it 
is published or not, and whether sources expect confidentiality. 273 That 
publication in itself affects the views and actions of the international 
community, and therefore arguably affects personal safety and the ability of 
war correspondents to continue to gather information, is not the same as the 
potential extent of the harm caused by the courts relying on their testimony. 
The Appeals Chamber considered that "[t]o publish information obtained 
from an interviewee is one thing - it is often the very purpose for which the 
interviewee gave the interview - but to testify against the interviewed 
person on the basis of the interview is quite another" because "the 
consequences for the interviewed persons are much worse in the latter case, 
as they may be found guilty in a war crimes trial and deprived of their 
liberty.274 
The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that "it is impossible to 
detem1ine with certainty whether and to what extent the compelling of war 
correspondents to testify before the International Tribunal would hamper 
272 See Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory Appeal" , para 43. Louise Arbour, former 
Prosecutor at the Tribunals, has been quoted as saying that " [t]he international media is 
often able to gain access to areas where investigators at the tribunals are unable to go ... On 
the other hand, press access might be cut off if war criminals in positions of power 
perceived that the international media was pressed into the service of law enforcement." 
Nina Bernstein "Can War Reporters be Witnesses, Too?" ( 14 December 2002) The New 
York Times New York <http:// loper.org/-george/trends/2002/Dec/75.html> (last accessed 
19 September 2003). 
273 See Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73.9 (11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 42. 
274 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 43. See also Prosecutor v Brdjanin and 
Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (17 August 2002) " Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Various 
Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal ' s Appeal of Trial Chamber' s 'Decision 
on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence"', para 36: "Even when 
findings are published and sources known, the link between the forced disclosure and the 
loss of journalist's independence is compelling, as it significantly changes the tone of 
journalist' s work and the willingness of sources to comply with reporters ' requests for 
interviews." An argument may be made that these statements indicate that the decision is 
limited to those situations where a war correspondent is called by the Prosecution to give 
evidence against one of their sources. Such an interpretation would, however, not be in line 
with the majority of the decision , which deals with the impact of testifying more broadly. 
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their ability to work," but considered that the potential impact was so 
serious that it "could not be lightly discarded."275 
Perhaps it was because of the difficulty in stating definitively what 
the harm caused by compelled testimony would be that lead to war 
correspondents being provided with a lesser privilege than ICRC workers, 
despite the latter potentially possessing more evidence of use to the 
Tribunals than the former. Or perhaps it was due to the role of journalists in 
the international community being seen as less important, or at least less 
well-defined, compared to that of the ICRC. In any case, the Appeals 
Chamber did not consider that the impact on this role was sufficient to 
outweigh the tribunals' need for journalists' evidence outright. Both Randal 
and the amici agreed with this, with the amici stating that "a qualified 
privilege strikes the right balance between protecting journalists in most 
cases, without fatally compromising in any case the important work of the 
Tribunal."276 The following section examines whether the Appeals Chamber 
test fairly represents the costs to the competing interests that are acceptable 
to the international community in light of the above discussion. 
D The Appeals Chamber Test: A Fair Balance? 
The Appeals Chamber considered that "society' s interest in 
protecting the integrity of the newsgathering process, and ensuring the free 
flow of inforn1ation to the public, is an interest of sufficient social 
importance to justify the incidental sacrifice of the facts needed in the 
administration of justice."277 Evidently the tests proposed by the an1ici and 
by Randal would result in more than merely an incidental sacrifice, and the 
275 Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdjanin, above, para 40 (Appeals Chamber). Certainly this is a 
problem in domestic contexts as well. For details regarding studies in this area see Vince 
Blasi "The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study" ( 1971) 70 Mich L Rev 229. 
276 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Ta/ic Case No IT-99-36-T (I 7 August 2002) " Brief Amici 
Curiae on BehalfofVarious Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal ' s Appeal of 
Trial Chamber' s ' Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give 
Evidence"', para 37. 
277 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-AR73 .9 ( 11 December 2002, 
Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Interlocutory Appeal", para 35 (quoting Shoen v Shoen 
( I 995) 5 F 3d 1289 (9th Cir). Emphasis added. 
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threshold of the Appeals Chamber test is therefore considerably lower. 278 
That limits on rights and freedoms must be 'proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued by the limitation' 1s a "well-established principle of 
international and national law."279 With regard to the balance between 
freedom of expression and the legitimate goal of having relevant and 
reliable evidence available in war crimes trials, the vital importance of the 
latter justifies encroachment of this right, and therefore the relatively low 
threshold of the Appeals Chamber test. A higher restriction on obtaining 
evidence would be incompatible with the purposes of the international 
criminal tribunals. 
A lower threshold is also more in line with the tribunals' approach of 
admitting most evidence and then considering what weight to accord it. It 
would be difficult for the judges to determine whether the evidence will be 
of the level of importance advocated by Randal and the amici before hearing 
it and placing it in the context of the rest of the trial. 
In the context of the tribunals, protecting the newsgathering ability 
of war correspondents serves the broader interests of the international 
community in international criminal justice, as well as in freedom of 
expression, and therefore some provision for this group is in line with the 
' spirit' of the governing Statutes. Indeed, this is also in the interests of the 
tribunals themselves. 
The 'pertinence' threshold suggested by the Trial Chamber was 
"insufficient to protect the public interest in the work of war 
correspondents."280 In contrast, the testimonial privilege acts to preserve the 
independence of this group and consequently their reputation as impartial 
observers. At the same time, a qualified privilege ensures that evidence that 
is "really significant" is available to the parties and subsequently to the 
278 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 47 (considering the requirement that 
evidence be ' essential ' to be too stringent in terms ofrestricting the availability of 
evidence). 
279 
Sara Stapleton " Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory 
Interpretation and the lmpermissibility of Derogation" (I 999) 31 NYU J Intl Land Poly 
535 , 589. 
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Chambers.281 Thus the two limbs of the Appeals Chamber test do not unduly 
restrict the ability of either the accused or the prosecutor to develop and 
present their case. In line with the approaches of other jurisdictions, the 
journalistic privilege is "always subject to an overriding requirement to 
disclose in the public interest."282 A valid consideration with regard to the 
second limb, however, is the difficulty that defendants face in obtaining the 
attendance of witnesses generally. That is, what constitutes a reasonable 
alternative source of the information for the Prosecution may be different 
from what is expected of the Defence. 
Any impact that the journalists' privilege will have on the right to 
obtain witnesses will be minimal and, assuming that the broader right to a 
fair trial is evident at all stages of the proceedings, it cannot be said that this 
will result in injustices. The defendant does not need to show that the 
journalists' testimony will prove their innocence, and where the threshold is 
not met this indicates that the interest in freedom of expression outweighs 
the their need for the evidence. 
Of greater concern is the residual ability of the Chambers to admit 
evidence obtained from journalists, even where their actual testimony does 
not meet the requirements of the Appeals Chamber test. Certainly it is up to 
the courts, both domestic and international, to determine what evidence can 
be admitted,283 but where this is done without the opportunity for cross-
examination there is a very real possibility that perceptions of the fairness of 
the proceedings will be diminished. 
E The Residual Admission of Evidence 
The threat to fair trial rights that anses from admitting evidence 
sourced from war correspondents arguably results more from the tribunals ' 
280 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 47. 
28 1 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, above, para 48. 
282 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic Case No IT-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber 11) 
"Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para ... 
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lenient approach to admissibility, rather than the decision to formulate a 
privilege. In fact, the judges have a great amount of discretion as to "what 
substitutes for live witnesses may be used."284 Ultimately, however, "[a] 
lowered threshold for the admission of evidence under the inquisitorial 
model will. .. be subject to due process considerations under a mixed 
regime" involving adversarial trial procedures.285 
With relevancy and probative value the only standards for 
admissibility, the news stories published by war correspondents appear to be 
valid evidence. That this is the case is further demonstrated by the emphasis 
that the Trial Chamber placed on the professional status and reputation of 
both Randal and the Washington Post as being indicative of the reliability of 
his evidence.286 Routinely admitting journalists' reports in this manner not 
only gives rise to the possibility of a trial being perceived as unfair, but also 
has the potential to undermine the underlying justification for granting a 
privilege if such reports are subsequently relied on in judgments. Arguably 
this is also the case when other forms of evidence are admitted as a result of 
a subpoena. For example, a journalist's notes, unpublished film footage or 
photographs, and documents obtained during the course of newsgathering. 
There is no discussion in Randal 's case regarding whether the privilege 
extends to such evidence, and this may well be an issue that the tribunals 
will need to deal with in the future. 
283 See Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330, para 67 (stating that "the 
admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law and as a 
general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them."). 
284 Patricia M Wald "To 'Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence': The Use of 
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings" (200 I) 42 Harv Intl 
L J 535, 545. 
285 
Christian DeFrancia " Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure 
Matters" (2001) 87 Va L Rev 1381 , 1424. 
286 Prosecutor v Brdjanin Case No IT-99-36-T (30 June 2003, Trial Chamber JI) " Decision 
on Prosecution 's Second Request for a Subpoena of Jonathan Randal", paras 28 and 42. 
The Trial Chamber considered that the indicia of reliability with regard to the accuracy of 
the quotes were that " 1) Randal is not a lay person randomly asking questions of an 
individual he just chanced to meet. Randal is a war correspondent seeking out the Accused 
and conducting an interview with him ; 2) Randal was present and interacting with the 
Accused and could verify his answers on the spot or pursue a similar line of questioning; 3) 
Randal subsequently published his interview in a reputable newspaper, thus staking his 
professional reputation on its accuracy .. . " This was despite the statement made in its earlier 
decision that " the objectivity and independence of journalists, and the media that publish 
their articles or reports, cannot be taken for granted a priori. " Prosecutor v Brdjanin and 
Ta/ic Case No IT-99-36-T (7 June 2002, Trial Chamber 11) " Decis ion on Motion to Set 
Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence", para 42. 
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Of course, the judges can determine the weighting to be accorded to 
evidence with regard to the impact on fair trial rights. It should be expected 
that the weight to be given to a news article or other written material would 
be "less than that of a live credible witness subject to cross-examination."287 
This has been evident in the few decisions that provide some indication of 
how the probative value of evidence is assessed.288 Furthermore, as in the 
case of Randal's article, the Trial Chamber will have regard to the claims of 
the defendant that the evidence is inaccurate. 289 If this is to result in the trial 
and final judgment being regarded as fair, the Trial Chamber should be 
explicit in the weighting that is attributed to the article and the reasons for 
this. In considering the reliability of the evidence, higher regard should be 
given to the fact that the author was not subject to cross-examination than to 
Randal's, or his interpreter's,290 professional reputation. 
VI JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
Some commentators argue that the international criminal law of 
procedure and evidence developed by the ad hoe tribunals will be "one of 
the main contributions that the Tribunals can deliver to any future 
permanent international criminal tribunal. "291 Certainly, decisions of the two 
287 Patricia M Wald "To 'Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence': The Use of 
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings" (2001) 42 Harv Intl 
L J 535,551. 
288 See Prosecutor v Delalic Case No IT-96-21-T (18 January 1998, Trial Chamber) 
" Decision on Motion of Prosecution for Admissibility of Evidence"; Prosecutor v Kordic 
and Cerkez Case No IT-95-14/2-AR (21 July 2000, Appeals Chamber) " Decision on 
Appeal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness"; Prosecutor v Aleksovski Case No IT-
95-14/1 (16 February 1999, Appeals Chamber) " Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on 
Admissibility of Evidence". 
289 Prosecutor v Brdjanin Case No IT-99-36-T (30 June 2003, Trial Chamber) " Decision on 
Prosecutor's Second Request for a Subpoena of Jonathan Randal", para 42. 
290 See Prosecutor v Brdjanin (Second Request), above, para 42 (the Trial Chamber stated 
that the weight to be accorded to Randal 's article "will depend to a great extent on evidence 
proving the level of [the interpreter's] proficiency in Serbo-Croatian at the time the 
interview took place."). 
29 1 Rod Dixon "Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals" ( 1997) Transnatl L and Contemp Prob 81 , I 02. The International Criminal Court 
was formed as a result of the coming into force of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (July 17 1998) 37 ILM 999 (hereinafter Rome Statute). The Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court were adopted by the Assembly 
of State Parties on I O September 2002. See Doc ICC-ASP/1 /3, available at 
<http://www. icc-cpi . int/1 ibrary/basicdocuments/rules( e ).pdf> (hereinafter I CC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence). 
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tribunals are not binding on the recently established International Criminal 
Court (ICC), but interpretations of their governing rules and statutes will be 
persuasive authority due to their similarities with those of the ICC. 292 
Although there are similarities, there are key differences that will 
impact considerably on the recognition of a qualified privilege for 
journalists on terms akin to the Appeals Chamber test. The first is that the 
ICC will apparently have less scope to develop rules 'ad hoe' as occurs in 
the ICTY and ICTR.293 Instead, amendments to the Rules will only take 
affect if there is a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of State Parties.294 
One commentator considers that "[t]his extra procedural step will allow 
better opportunities for debate over the merits of such Rule changes and 
their effect on the integrity of the judicial process."295 
A feature of major importance is the prov1s10n m the Rules for 
privileges for certain types of communications and information that is 
clearly influenced by Wigmore ' s four criteria. Not only is there a lawyer-
client privilege,296 but it is possible for "communications made in the 
context of a class of professional or other confidential relationships" to be 
regarded as privileged if the following conditions are met: 297 
(a) Communications occurring within that class of relationship are made 
in the course of a confidential relationship producing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and non-disclosure; 
292 Sara Stapleton "Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory 
Interpretation and the Impermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 31 NYU J Intl Land Poly 
535, 570. In drafting the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the International 
Law Commission was clearly influenced by the work of the ICTY. See Scott T Johnson 
"On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1998) I O Intl Legal Persp 111 , 154. The ICC Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence contain much more detail than the ICTY Rules, with a total of 
225 Rules compared to the ICTY ' s 127. 
293 Indeed, The ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence contain much more detail than the 
ICTY Rules, with a total of225 Rules compared to the ICTY ' s 127. 
294 Rome Statute, Article 51. The judges are able to submit recommendations to the Parties, 
and can also pass temporary provisions, which can then be made permanent at the next 
Assembly. 
295 Christian DeFrancia "Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure 
Matters" (2001) 87 Va L Rev 1381 , 1431. 
296 
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 73(1) mirrors Rule 97 of the lCTY Rules. 
See footnotes 104-105. 
297 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 73(2). 
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(b) Confidentiality is essential to the nature and type of relationship 
between the person and the confidant; and 
(c) Recognition of the privilege would further the objectives of the 
Statute and the Rules. 
Although the journalist-source relationship is not mentioned 
specifically in the provision,298 the categories are not closed.299 Thus there is 
a strong argument that even if the ICC could directly apply the Appeals 
Chamber approach to considering the existence of a broad journalistic 
privilege, there is no gap in the Rules that necessitates such a consideration. 
The fact that there is no reference to non-confidential information may 
require discussion by the judges and the Assembly of the Parties in light of 
the findings in Randal 's case, but the judges could not read this into the 
Rule due to its clear wording. 
Certainly the first step for the Court would be to explicitly recognise 
that international human rights law and general principles of law confirm 
the importance of freedom of expression,3°0 and that a privilege for 
journalists fulfils the third criteria of the ICC test in that it is conducive to 
achieving the objectives of international justice. Such an interpretation of 
the Rule is particularly justified in light of the Rome Statute's applicable 
law provision, which clearly states that "[t]he application and interpretation 
of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights."301 
298 Rule 73(3) states that the Court will have "particular regard to recognising as privileged 
those communications made in the context of the professional relationship between a 
person and his or her medical doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist or counsellor, in particular 
those related to or involving victims, or between a person and a member of a religious 
clergy." 
299 See Christian DeFrancia "Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure 
Matters" (2001) 87 Va L Rev 1381 , 1435. 
300 That these sources of law are highly relevant to interpreting the governing documents of 
the ICC is recognised in the Rome Statute ' s "Applicable Law" provision. Article 21 (1) 
states that the Court shall apply: "(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and 
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established 
principles of the international law of armed conflict; ( c) Failing that, general principles of 
law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as 
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with 
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards." 
30 1 Rome Statute, art 21 (3). 
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The decision of the ICTY to grant a broad privilege to ICRC 
workers had a strong influence on the formulation of a specific rule for the 
application of this in the ICC.302 Rule 73(4) provides:303 
The Court shall regard as privileged, and consequently not subject to 
disclosure, including by way of testimony of any present or past official 
or employee of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
any information, documents or other evidence which it came into the 
possession of in the course, or as a consequence, of the performance by 
ICRC of its functions under the Statutes of the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement, unless: 
(a) After consultations undertaken pursuant to sub-rule 6, ICRC does not 
object in writing to such disclosure, or otherwise has waived this 
privilege; or (b) Such infomiation, documents or other evidence is 
contained in public statements and documents of ICRC. 
The Rule goes on to set out the conditions that give rise to the need 
for consultations between the Court and the ICRC, which require the Court 
to determine whether "ICRC information, documents or other evidence are 
of great importance for a particular case."304 In deciding to take this course, 
the Court will also have regard to "the circumstances of the case, the 
relevance of the evidence sought, whether the evidence could be obtained 
from a source other than ICRC, the interests of justice and of victims, and 
the performance of the Court's and ICRC's functions."305 
In light of this provision, the Appeals Chamber test in Randal 's case 
should be given considerable emphasis in establishing a similarly clear and 
principled privilege for war correspondents in the Rules of the ICC. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The Appeals Chamber decision in Randal 's case is part of the 
development of a comprehensive procedural framework that "promises to 
302 See Part IV B Other Evidentiary Privileges in the International Tribunals. 
303 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 73(4). 
304 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 73(6). 
305 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 73(6) 
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spawn an entirely new international system of great importance."306 The 
formulation of procedural rules will face the scrutiny of the international 
community. They must therefore be clear and principled, and meet the 
expectation that the international criminal justice system will respect 
fundamental human rights. The realities of the system are, however, 
different from any others in existence at either the domestic or the 
international level. The procedural framework that results will therefore be 
unique. At the same time, specific rules must be based to a large degree on 
principles that have developed over time in response to similar issues to 
those faced by the international tribunals. The Appeals Chamber's framing 
of the test to overcome the journalistic privilege is certainly grounded in the 
underlying rationale for this privilege in other jurisdictions, and even 
reflects more specific principles evident in their approaches. 
It is a feature of the work of the international tribunals that certain 
interests will inevitably come into conflict with each other. In particular, the 
desire of the prosecutor to secure convictions, the need for the accused to be 
able to present a defence, a court ' s interest in both of these factors in order 
to maintain its legitimacy, and the rights of other parties who are affected in 
the process. In general, therefore, the interests of the international criminal 
justice system are best served by achieving a fair balance that takes into 
account its broader purpose of furthering the establishment of peace. 
In this context, the Appeals Chamber test for overcoming the 
evidentiary privilege of war correspondents protects the need, indeed the 
right, of the international community to receive information about activities 
that occur during conflicts, while ensuring that the important fact-finding 
function of the tribunals is not overly hindered. Furthermore, neither the 
rights of the accused or of war correspondents are derogated from in a way 
that is contrary to international human rights standards. The tribunals should 
be concerned, however, with ensuring that the rights of the accused are 
taken into account at all stages of the proceedings, particularly in terms of 
306 Rod Dixon " Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals" ( 1997) Transnatl L and Con temp Prob 81 , 102. 
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the weight given to any evidence that has not been subject to cross-
examination. 
The answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper are 
therefore as follows: 
1) The recognition of the privilege was in accordance with the authority to 
establish procedural rules provided by the Statute and by Rule 89(B) of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
2) The Appeals Chamber acted consistently with the ' spirit' of its 
constituent documents and with general principles of law as required by 
that Rule. Apart from these sources, human rights standards are 
applicable to the Tribunals, and the journalists' privilege respects these 
and the conflict between them; 
3) More generally, there was a 'fair determination' of the issues raised by 
Randal 's case, which in turn serves the broader interests of the 
international criminal justice system in maintaining its legitimacy, 
particularly as the result is clear, principled, and justified in light of the 
applicable sources of law. 
With regard to the practice of taking into account the special 
circumstances of the tribunals in formulating rules, this would seem a 
realistic and acceptable approach in most situations, provided the result is 
generally consistent with the above considerations. The reasoning and 
decision of the Appeals Chamber in Randal 's case, however, is not only 
applicable in the specific context of the ICTY, but also to the international 
criminal justice system as a whole. The newly established International 
Criminal Court should therefore engage in a similar discussion regarding a 
journalistic privilege. 
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